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ABSTRACT
Davis, Zachary G. PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Essays on University Competition. Major Professors: Kevin J. Mumford and John M. Barron.
The dissertation is comprised of two independent chapters on competition between
universities and how government policy changes the nature of the competition. The
first chapter looks at how in-state tuition e↵ects competition between public and
private four year universities. The second chapter looks at how federal aid e↵ects the
behavior of individual for-profit universities, and estimates the e↵ect of a rule change
on the amount of federal aid revenue collected by for-profit universities.
In the first chapter, I note that universities use institutional aid to discriminate
between students of di↵ering abilities. I estimate that public universities provide
$107 of aid per ACT point on average, while private universities provide $238 of aid
per ACT point on average. In public sector universities, in-state and out-of-state
students are o↵ered similar amounts of institutional aid per ACT point. However,
private universities use institutional aid to discriminate between in-state and out-ofstate students, providing in-state students approximately twice as much institutional
aid per ACT point than out-of-state students. Since students pay the same tuition at
private universities regardless of their home state, this location based discrimination
is surprising. I develop a general equilibrium model populated with heterogeneous
educational institutions to explain why private universities price discriminate in favor
of in-state students. The model shows that a low in-state tuition and student preferences for staying in their home state supports private, but not public, universities
o↵ering lower net prices to in-state students as an equilibrium. I then illustrate how
the model can be used to evaluate public policy changes, such as changes in public
tuition policies and changes in state subsidies to public universities. The model pre-
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dicts that decreasing a public university’s in-state tuition causes the private university
in the same state to decrease enrollment which increases the average ability of their
student body. The overall e↵ect of the tuition decrease causes the share of low ability
students attending a university to increase.
In the second chapter, I investigate the e↵ect of the Higher Education Opportunity
Act (HEOA), passed in 2008, which reauthorizes the Higher Education Act of 1965.
The HEOA relaxed the 90/10 rule, which requires for-profit institutions to receive at
least ten percent of their revenue from non-federal sources, on for-profit institutions
by revoking federal aid eligibility after two years of violating the rule instead of one
year, which went into e↵ect in 2010. When submitting regulatory compliance reports,
postsecondary institutions are allowed to bundle together di↵erent campuses. I study
the e↵ect disallowing bundling would have on the number of for-profit campuses,
and the e↵ect of the rule change on for-profit institution bundling behavior and the
amount of federal aid revenue received by for-profit institutions. I find that students
at for-profit institutions more federal aid after the rule change, even after accounting
for demographic changes. I create a theory comparing for-profit institution bundling
behavior under the two di↵erent violation rules. I find that for-profit institutions
increase the size of the bundles under the two year violation rule, which I also observe
in the data. I find that unbundling the campuses approximately doubles the number
of one year violations though the number of two year violations remains roughly the
same. Before the rule change in 2010, the majority of one year rule violators where
bundled with other campuses. I also estimate the amount of federal aid revenue forprofit institutions receive with and without the rule change. I find that for-profit
institutions receive almost one billion dollars more federal aid revenue under the two
year violation rule, which is about 4.5 percent more than they would have received
under the one year violation rule.

1

1. DISCRIMINATION BY LOCATION: UNIVERSITY
PRICING BEHAVIOR AND IN-STATE TUITION
1.1

Introduction
The nature of competition between universities remains elusive. Universities value

revenue and their students’ average academic ability, and tuition generates much of
their revenue. The supply of academically exceptional students is finite, unfortunately, so universities must compete for the best and the brightest. To attract the
best and the brightest, universities o↵er a discount from their posted tuition called
institutional aid. The tradeo↵ between student ability and revenue may depend on
whether the university is publicly or privately owned. Universities also have access
to each student’s family’s financial records, allowing universities to price discriminate
by income. While price discrimination by ability and income are both well known
and well studied features of the higher education market, universities also price discriminate by a student’s state of origin.
On average, I estimate that public universities provide $107 of institutional aid
per point on the ACT1 . Private universities provide $238 of aid per point on the ACT.
Allowing aid per ACT point to vary by a student’s location, public universities still
provide about $107 of aid per ACT point to both in-state and out-of-state students.
Private universities favor in-state students, providing them $295 of aid per point as
opposed to only $166 of aid point to out-of-state students.
Both public and private universities discriminate by location. Though public
universities do not use institutional aid to discriminate by location, they explicitly
post a lower tuition for in-state students. The lower in-state tuition is set by the
1

Throughout this paper, I use the ACT instead of the SAT. Universities accept both, though some
prefer one to the other. In recent years, the same number of students are taking the ACT and the
SAT.
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state, which funds public universities using state tax revenue. On the other hand,
private universities have no apparent incentive to discriminate by location, yet they
provide more institutional aid per ACT point to in-state students. In my paper, I use
the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study to provide robust empirical evidence
that private universities price discriminate by location using institutional aid. I then
develop a general equilibrium model to explain why private universities discriminate
by location.
General equilibrium models of the higher education market have recently become
popular. Both Epple et al. (2013) and Fu (2014) develop general equilibrium models
to study the e↵ects of di↵erent public policies on the competition between universities
for students. As in Epple et al. and Fu, my model includes both public and private
universities competing for students across states. My model di↵ers from Epple et al.
(2013) by allowing public universities to set out-of-state tuition and to provide institutional aid to students. Fu (2014) does not allow universities to choose institutional
aid, since she is more interested in studying the students university choice. Since I
am interested in university price setting behavior, I allow public and private universities to choose the amount of aid provided to each type of student. In my model,
universities choose institutional aid amounts, which vary by ability and are allowed to
di↵er between in-state and out-of-state students. Public universities post the tuition
for out-of-state students, but state governments exogenously set the in-state tuition.
Private universities post one tuition that applies to all students, regardless of where
they live. There is no explicit incentive for a private university to favor one student
over any other based solely on the student’s home state.
The universities I study are all non-profit institutions. Presumably, non-profit
institutions do not maximize profits, so it is unclear what to include in a university2
objective function. Horwitz and Nichols (2007) identifies four categories of non-profit
firm objectives, which are firm output maximization, market output maximization,
2

The literature on non-profit institutions focuses mostly on the healthcare industry, but the models
are general enough in most cases that they can be applied to the higher education industry.
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profit maximization 3 , and a combination of firm output and profit maximization.
Firm output and market output objectives generally are constrained to make zero
profit, and maximize some combination of quantity and quality of output. Profit
maximizing non-profit institutions maximize profit, though profit accrues to the administration of the non-profit firm as increased salaries, nicer offices, and other perks.
Epple et al. (2013) specifies universities as firm output maximizers, with each university maximizing the quality of the student body. Fu (2014) specifies universities as
maximizing both firm output and profit. I follow Fu (2014)’s lead, and universities
in my model maximize both the student body quality and profit.
Student preferences explain why private universities discriminate in favor of instate students. Applying to universities involves more than just a financial cost.
Fu (2014) estimates that applying to the first university costs about $1,900 while
applying to the second costs about $900.4 My model assumes that students apply
only to two universities to account for application costs. The students decide to
which two universities to apply based on their preferences. Some students want to
stay near home, so they only apply to universities in their home state. Some students
want small class sizes and engaged professors. These students apply only to private
universities, since private universities are generally much smaller than publics. Some
students want access to the resources provided by a large state school. These students
apply only to public universities.
With these three groups, in-state applicants to a private university are a mix between students who want to stay near home and students who want small class sizes.
Out-of-state applicants to a private university just prefer smaller class sizes. Due to
state governments setting a low in-state tuition, some of the in-state applicants are
willing to attend a significantly lower priced option. The out-of-state applicants alternative options are not as cheap as in-state applicants, since private universities are
generally more expensive. To compete for the in-state students, the private university
3

Horwitz and Nichols (2007) call this the “for-profit in disguise” theory.
She finds the marginal cost of applying decreases in the number of applications sent, suggesting
economies of scale.
4
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o↵ers in-state applicants a lower price. A lower price could be set by o↵ering in-state
students the same lump sum discount, but universities value high ability students;
so private universities use institutional aid to compete with public universities for
in-state students.
In section 1.2, I provide robust empirical evidence that private university discriminate by location using institutional aid. I then develop a theoretical model in section
1.3 that uses in-state tuition and student preferences to explain location discrimination in private universities. Apart from explaining location based discrimination in
private universities, my model includes an exogenously set in-state tuition at public
universities. In recent years, state governments have decreased the funding at public
universities, allowing those universities to increase in-state tuition. Figure 1.1 shows
the average in-state tuition in states with Big Ten universities from 1995 to 2009.
The pricing hierarchy remained relatively constant until the early 2000’s, when states
began allowing universities to increase their in-state tuition. For example, Minnesota
and Illinois used to have some of the least expensive in-state public universities. Now
they are among the most expensive. The general equilibrium e↵ects of changing
in-state tuition are not well understood, and I address this question in section 1.4.
There, I provide general equilibrium comparative static results for a decrease in
one state’s in-state tuition. My model predicts that an decrease in tuition increases
the share of low ability students attending a university and decreases the share of
middle and high ability students attending a university. The public university in
which the tuition decrease occurs also decreases the amount of institutional aid per
ability it awards students, causing an increase in their share of in-state students but
a decrease in the average ability of their student body. The private university in
the state that decreased public in-state tuition responds to their competitor’s tuition
decrease by increasing their sticker price tuition and the amount of institutional aid
per ability awarded to its students. Their share of in-state and out-of-state students
decreases, but the average ability of their student body increases. The tuition decrease
also directly impacts the other state’s public university, causing it to increase their
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out-of-state tuition and increase the amount of institutional aid per ability awarded
to its out-of-state students. Their share of out-of-state students decreases, but the
average ability of the out-of-state students increases. I also provide comparative
static results for a decrease in one state’s subsidy per in-state student subsidy, and
an increase in demand for higher education. Section 1.5 provides concluding remarks
and extensions.

1.2

Empirical Findings
My paper focuses on the private university’s pricing response to public in-state

tuition, but my model must also explain other aspects of the higher education market.
Students in the model choose which university to attend. Universities in the model
choose tuition as well as institutional aid. Other researchers have already investigated
related topics.
Long (2004) studies how in-state tuition e↵ects a student’s choice of university.
She finds that with in-state tuition, 71 percent of four year students attend the public
university. Without state support, only 56 percent of four year students would attend
the public university and enrollment would increase at two year colleges. She also finds
evidence that decreasing in-state tuition incentivizes students to attend the cheaper
public university, even if the private option o↵ers more educational resources. Her
paper provides evidence that state educational policy e↵ects a student’s choice of
university, though she does not investigate how universities might respond if states
cease controlling in-state tuition.
Other papers study how state or federal financial aid e↵ects a student’s desire
to attend a university.5 They find that merit based financial aid programs, such
as the Georgia HOPE scholarships, tend to increase enrollment and need based aid
programs, such as Pell grants, have little to no e↵ect on enrollment. These studies do
not address the role institutional aid plays in the student’s decision process, though
5

See Angrist (1993), Angrist and Chen (2011), Kane (1995), Dynarski (2003), Dynarski (2002),
Dynarski (2000), Singell et al. (2006) and Monks (2009) for further discussion.

6
they do suggest that o↵ering merit aid is a more e↵ective recruitment strategy than
o↵ering need based aid. My theory accounts for the role of institutional aid by
allowing institutional aid to depend on a student’s ability, but not their income.
Hurwitz (2012) estimates that an additional $1000 of institutional aid increases the
probability the student will attend that university by 1.66 percentage points. The elasticity he estimates varies by income. The probability low income students (<$50,000)
attend a university increases by 3 percentage points in response to an additional $1000
of institutional aid, while the probability high income students ( $250,000) attend
increases by about 1 percentage point. Curs (2008) conducts a similar study on the
e↵ect of merit based aid at the University of Oregon. He finds that a $1000 increase
in merit aid increases an in-state student’s enrollment probability by 6.8 percentage
points. The same increase in merit aid increases an out-of-state student’s enrollment
probability by only 2.5 percentage points. He also finds that need based grants have
little e↵ect on enrollment probability. Hurwitz and Curs’s results demonstrate that
students respond to institutional aid o↵ers.
The model I create must also explain tuition. Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) study
the causes of tuition and enrollment fluctuations at public universities. They identify
state demographics/institutional characteristics, sources of institutional aid, sources
of student financial aid, enrollment pressure, and school quality/competitive position
as possible sources of tuition and enrollment fluctuations. Using institutional and
state level data, they regress state need-based grant aid, in-state tuition, out-ofstate tuition, and the nonresident share of students on their list of sources. They find
evidence that public universities use out-of-state students to increase the student body
quality rather than supplement revenues. Curs and Dar (2010) ask whether pricing
strategies respond to changes in state financial aid policies. Using panel data, they
estimate how state level grants e↵ect public tuition, private tuition and institutional
grant aid, controlling for federal grants, di↵erent measures of institutional revenue,
enrollment, and demographic variables. They find that federal grants tend to increase
both tuition and institutional aid amount. State appropriations decrease tuition and
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institutional aid, and university investment income increases tuition and institutional
aid. The empirical research on tuition setting behavior focuses on pricing responses
to state and federal aid, but not public sector in-state tuition.
Understanding tuition setting behavior requires state or institutional level data,
at a minimum. Institutional level data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) is free, publicly available, and widely used. Student level
data, however, is necessary to understand how institutional aid varies between students. Epple et al. (2003), Doyle et al. (2009), and Doyle (2010) all use the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), containing data on individual students
and their financial aid awards. Epple et al. (2003) regress institutional aid on SAT
score, GPA, income, and state and race variables. They interact each with a dummy
variable for private universities, and a dummy for low ranked universities. They find
that institutional aid is unresponsive to SAT at top ranked schools, but top ranked
schools do respond to GPA by increasing institutional aid by about $690 per GPA
point. Doyle et al. (2009) study how institutional aid responds to Pell Grants and
state grants, as well as income and ability, in public four year universities. They find
institutional aid increases with ability and decreases with income, and that public
universities tend to complement state aid policies. Doyle (2010) estimates a similar
equation as Doyle et al. (2009), using a series of NPSAS releases6 . Estimating the
equation separately for each year, he finds a shift towards rewarding merit and away
from funding need. My theory considers only student ability, not income, and Doyle’s
observation that universities are shifting toward merit aid supports that choice.

1.2.1

Data

I conduct my analysis using the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS)
and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). The NPSAS
contains demographic and financial information on individual students enrolled in a
6

He uses the 1992-1993, 1995-1996, 1999-2000, and 2003-2004 NPSAS releases
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university, including financial aid awards. I use the 2003-2004, 2007-2008, and 20112012 NPSAS releases to estimate my model. Epple et al. (2003), Doyle et al. (2009),
and Doyle (2010) all use earlier waves of the NPSAS from the 1990’s. Only Doyle
(2010) uses the 2003-2004 NPSAS, which is the most recent data he uses but the
earliest data I use. I use the IPEDS to calculate mean tuition of the di↵erent types
of universities.
In the NPSAS, I restrict my sample to public and private non-profit four year
universities that are selective. There are three measures of selectivity: minimally
selective, moderately selective, and very selective. Selectivity is calculated using a
combination of the 25th and 75th SAT and/or ACT percentiles and the university
admittance rate.7 I estimate my model for each di↵erent selectivity category, since
very selective universities may have a di↵erent aid policy than minimally selective
universities.
My dependent variable is a student’s institutional aid. I am interested in how
universities di↵er in their aid packages to in-state versus out-of-state students, so I
include both merit and need based aid, as well as work-study and athletic aid in my
measure of institutional aid. I do not include loans made by the institution, since
those must be paid back by the student.
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics. Comparing the percent of students with
aid between in-state and out-of-state students in private universities, the discrimination favoring in-state students is already apparent. A higher percentage of in-state
students get aid in private universities. It isn’t surprising to see public universities
providing more aid to out-of-state students, but it is surprising to see private universities favoring in-state students.
My main independent variable is the student’s ACT score. The 2008 and 2012
NPSAS contain a derived ACT score. The derived score is the actual ACT score, if
the student took the ACT, or it is the ACT equivalent if the student took the SAT.
The 2004 NPSAS does not contain a derived ACT score, but it does contain the
7

The selectivity measure was developed for the IPEDS.
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actual ACT and SAT scores for students who took those tests. I impute the ACT
score in 2004 by regressing the ACT score on the SAT verbal and math scores. I use
the coefficients from that regression to impute the 2004 ACT scores for students who
only have SAT scores. Dropping the 2004 NPSAS from the regression does not e↵ect
the qualitative results. I drop all students without an ACT score from the regressions
(Jones, 1996).
The NPSAS contains data on whether the student pays in-state or out-of-state
tuition at public universities. I consider every student that pays in-state tuition as
being an in-state student, even if they are not from the same state as their university.
For private universities, I consider a student to be in-state if their university is in
the student’s home state. Previous studies have accounted for lump sum di↵erences
in aid between in-state and out-of-state students. I interact the student’s in-state
status with the sector of their university as well as their ACT score, which allows
me to observe di↵erences between how public and private universities reward ability
between in-state and out-of-state students.
When applying to a university, potential students submit their ACT score, high
school GPA, a writing sample, and letters of recommendation. In addition, students
filing a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) let universities know their
financial situation. In all specifications, I’ve included most of the demographic characteristics universities use in determining the institutional aid award, but I have
excluded the university’s own tuition and the students high school GPA. I exclude
tuition from the controls, since universities choose tuition and institutional aid simultaneously in my theoretical model. Including tuition does not change the result.
Unlike the ACT score, high school GPA is difficult to compare across students from
di↵erent high schools. Also, high school GPA signals dependability as well as ability.
Including high school GPA as a control complicates the interpretation of the ACT
score’s marginal e↵ect by distributing the e↵ect of academic ability on institutional
aid across multiple variables.
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1.2.2

Methodology

I regress institutional aid on student ACT scores interacted with their university’s
sector and whether they they are in-state or out-of-state. My specification is:
Aidij =

0

+

1 ACTij

· P ubInij +

· P rivInij +

+

3 ACTij

+

5 P ubOutij

+

2 ACTij

4 ACTij

6 P rivInij

+

· P ubOutij

· P rivOutij

7 P rivOutij

+ Controlsij + "ij

(1.1)

Here, Aidij is the amount of institutional aid provided to student i at school j,
ACTij is student i’s derived ACT score and P ubIn, P rivIn, P ubOut, and P rivOut
are indicators for public in-state students, private in-state students, public out-ofstate students, and private out-of-state students, respectively. Gender, race, income,
dependency status, expected family contribution (EFC), school selectivity, year, and
total enrollments are included as controls.
In equation 1.1, I am interested in how a student’s ability e↵ects a university’s
institutional aid award decision but many students do not receive any institutional
aid. I cannot exclude those students receiving no institutional aid, though, because
that will bias my estimates. In the model, we assume Aidij has a randomly distributed
component, "ij . Suppose the only di↵erence between two students with a relatively
low ACT score is that one student received institutional aid, while the other did
not. For students with relatively low ACT scores, including only the ones who have
received aid will bias our estimates downward. If students with high ACT scores
generally receive some aid, their error terms will be independently and identically
distributed since none would be excluded. Students with low ACT scores do not
receive aid as often as high ACT score students, so only including those receiving
some aid excludes students in the lower tail of the error term’s distribution. Models
observing only large shocks for observations on one part of the sample decrease the
slope of the line if the slope is positive, as it is in this case, and negatively biases the
OLS estimator.

11
Also, in the case of some students, the university might be willing to admit low
ACT students if those students paid a price higher than the posted tuition. O↵ering
a negative amount of institutional aid would accomplish this goal, but a university’s
advertised tuition is the highest price they are able to charge. Since negative institutional aid may be desirable but impossible and the OLS estimator is likely negatively
biased by students not receiving any institutional aid, I follow Epple et al. (2003),
Doyle et al. (2009), and Doyle (2010) in treating institutional aid as censored data,
and interpret Aidij as a function of the latent variable Aid⇤ij :
8
< Aid⇤ if Aid⇤
0
ij
ij
Aidij =
: 0
if Aid⇤ij < 0

(1.2)

Aid⇤ij can be interpreted as the institutional aid amount a university would like to
award a student if they were able to charge more than the advertised tuition. I
estimate equation 1.1 using a Tobit model to account for the censored data.
Tobit model estimates can be reported three di↵erent ways: the partial e↵ects
of the ACT interaction terms on E(Aid⇤ij |controlsij ), the e↵ect on the latent variable, E(Aidij |Aidij > 0, controlsij ), the e↵ect on the conditional expectation, and
E(Aidij |controlsij ), the e↵ect on the unconditional expectation.
I interpret the Tobit estimates using the conditional expectation. Since universities cannot award negative institutional aid, interpreting the e↵ect on the latent
variable is meaningless. Furthermore, I am only interested in how the ACT e↵ects
university institutional aid award decisions. Using the unconditional expectation to
interpret the partial e↵ects gives weight to students who did not receive any aid
from the university. The appropriate measure of the ACT score’s marginal e↵ect on
institutional aid is the conditional expectation.
In my theoretical model, the university chooses the posted tuition and institutional
aid. Choosing the institutional aid is equivalent to choosing the marginal e↵ect of
the ACT score. In my model, I do not allow any portion of the ACT distribution to
receive zero aid, and the conditional marginal e↵ect captures this aspect of my model
best.
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1.2.3

Empirical Results

Table 1.2 reports the OLS estimates as well as the latent and conditional Tobit
estimates. Tables 1.3, and 1.4 report only the conditional Tobit estimates. The
marginal e↵ects of the ACT score on institutional aid without considering location
are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 in table 1.2. The OLS estimates public universities
o↵er $128.4 of aid per ACT point on average, while private universities o↵er $345.6
per point. The latent variable Tobit estimates that publics provide $439.8 per ACT
point and privates provide $434.3 per point. Conditional on the student receiving
some aid, I find that public universities o↵er $107.3 of aid per ACT point and private
universities o↵er $237.6 of aid per point.
Both the OLS and the latent variable Tobit marginal e↵ects are larger than conditional marginal e↵ects, which is true for all specifications. The latent variable
assumptions in the Tobit model allow the university to o↵er negative aid, increasing the slope estimates as discussed above. For this reason, I prefer the conditional
marginal e↵ects calculated using the latent Tobit estimates. Since the Tobit is nonlinear, calculating the marginal e↵ects requires the other independent variables to be
fixed at some value. The conditional marginal e↵ects in tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 are
calculated at the means of the other independent variables. The OLS estimates are
closer to the conditional marginal e↵ects than the latent variable Tobit estimates,
but are still larger because I calculate the conditional marginal e↵ects at the means
of the other independent variables.
The marginal e↵ects of the ACT score on institutional aid allowing universities
to discriminate by location are in columns 4, 5, and 6 in table 1.2. Conditional
on a student receiving some aid, public universities provide $105.5 of aid per ACT
point to in-state students and provide $102.7 of aid per point to out-of-state students.
Private universities provide $294.5 per ACT point to in-state students and $166 of
aid per ACT point to out-of-state students. The di↵erence between in-state and
out-of-state marginal e↵ect of the ACT score are found in the Di↵erence row. The
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$128.5 di↵erence between in-state and out-of-state aid o↵ers at private universities is
evidence that they favor in-state students, and is statistically di↵erent from zero and
economically large.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 in table 1.2 include all selective universities, but selectivity
varies across institutions. Table 1.3 estimates equation 1.1 for each selectivity separately as well as for the subsample of dependent students.8 Though the magnitude
of the marginal e↵ects change across specifications, it is always the case that private
universities provide more aid to in-state students. Very selective universities favor
in-state students the most, providing them $125.3 more than out-of-state students
per point on the ACT. Moderately selective universities favor in-state students the
least, providing them $65.04 of aid per ACT point. Restricting the sample to only the
dependent students, private universities provide in-state students $146.9 more than
out-of-state students per ACT point. The di↵erence between aid o↵ers to in- and
out-of-state students at private universities is not only large, but statistically significant. The di↵erence in aid o↵ers at public universities is relatively small, changes
sign across specifications, and is not statistically significant.
The conditional marginal e↵ects are calculated at the means of the control variables, but it could be that private universities aid o↵ers to in- and out-of-state students
could vary depending on the student’s level of income or their ACT score percentile.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 graph the ACT score’s marginal e↵ect on aid as the ACT percentile varies and as the student’s income varies, with 95 percent confidence intervals
for each estimate. In both figures, the ACT score’s marginal e↵ect on aid for in-state
students at private universities is larger than for out-of-state students. Figure 1.2
shows that as the ACT percentile increases, so does the marginal e↵ect of the ACT
score on institutional aid. Figure 1.3 shows that as the student’s income percentile
increases, the ACT’s marginal e↵ect slightly decreases.
Table 1.4 contains conditional marginal e↵ects of the ACT score on aid for the four
census regions. Public universities in each of the regions have no consistent pattern
8

Dependent students are still claimed as dependent by their parents when filing taxes.
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as to whether they favor in-state or out-of-state students with aid per point on the
ACT. In the west, public universities provide $59.23 more to in-state students per
ACT point while public universities in the northeast provide out-of-state students
with $50.19 more in aid per ACT point than in-state students. Across regions in
the private universities, the only statistically significant di↵erence between in-state
and out-of-state aid per ACT point is in the northeast. Northeastern private schools
provide $235.2 more in aid per ACT point to in-state students. Discrimination in
favor of in-state students is still large in the south, as southern private universities
provide about $63.52 more to in-state students than out-of-state students, though
the di↵erence is not statistically significant. The result that private universities favor
in-state students is driven mostly by universities in the northeast. The majority of all
private universities are on the eastern seaboard, mostly in the northeast, so this result
is not surprising. The di↵erence between the point estimates in private universities
are consistently negative across regions, while public universities show no pattern.
The empirical evidence showing private universities o↵ering more aid to in-state
students is robust to alternative specifications. I now develop a theoretical model to
explain this phenomenon and address comparative static questions.

1.3

Theory
While the higher education market is subject to regulations and receives subsidies

from both the state and federal governments, the market also includes a rigorous
application process with multiple decisions on both the student’s and the university’s
parts. Fu (2014) notes a complete model would endogenize tuition, applications,
admission, enrollment, and financial aid but such a model would complicate the empirical analysis to the point of intractability. In her model, both private and public
universities endogenously set tuition but institutional aid is exogenously determined.
Tuition is determined by a university’s relative preference for student ability over
profit and by students expected utility for that particular university.
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Epple, Romano, and Sieg have developed a model of the higher education market9 endogenize financial aid by letting universities perfectly price discriminate.10 But
these papers leave applications exogenous and do not di↵erentiate between private
and public universities. Their 2008 paper is similar to their previous work, except
they investigate racial diversity in higher education by allowing universities to distinguish between two types of students in their objective function. Epple et al. (2013)
builds on the previous versions of their model by di↵erentiating between public and
private universities and and setting them in multiple states. In the 2013 model, public
universities choose a minimum ability threshold for admissions but their tuition is set
exogenously, and private universities choose tuition subject to an exogenous upper
limit.
Another aspect of the Epple, Romano, and Sieg model is that students include
both tuition and quality of the university in their utility function, where quality of
the student body and expenditure per student determine the overall quality of the
university. Fu (2014)’s approach di↵ers in that student utility from attending a university is stochastic. In Fu’s approach, the mean of the distribution can be interpreted
to include the student’s perception of the university’s quality. Fu’s approach allows
more flexibility interpreting how students value each university, and my model will
follow her lead in this respect.
My primary goal is to investigate the e↵ects of state level tuition policies on
institutional aid choices at public and private schools. My approach is similar to
the approach of Epple et al. (2013), though I allow public universities to set out-ofstate tuition. In my model, universities choose their student population by pricing
undesirable students out of their institution. I also abstract away from the application
process by assuming that if a student applies, they will be admitted, and applying is
9

See Epple et al. (2002), Epple et al. (2003), and Epple et al. (2006).
Epple and Romano published papers in 1998 and 2002 modeling the secondary education market,
investigating the e↵ects of educational vouchers. The model based on their 1998 paper is significantly
di↵erent than their higher education market model. Besides the di↵erences in public policy at
the secondary and post-secondary educational levels, their 1998 model has private high schools
maximizing profit, instead of quality.
10
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costly. States provide subsidies to public universities for each in-state student that
enrolls. Since I am focusing on e↵ects of state level tuition policy, state and federal
student aid does not play a significant role in my analysis. I include only institutional
aid in my model. Both Turner (2012) and Turner (2014a) provide empirical evidence
that universities respond to federal student aid by decreasing institutional aid, and
Epple et al. (2013) develop a theoretical framework in which universities capture
federal student aid by increasing tuition. Additionally, I do not include the state as
an actor in my model, aside from exogenously setting in-state tuition. Groen and
White (2004), Fethke (2005), and Fethke (2006) all include preferences of a state
government in their analyses of university price setting, focusing on the strategic
interaction between the two institutions in setting a public universities price.

1.3.1

Environment

My model exists in a world containing two states, denoted by s 2 S = {1, 2}.
Each state has two universities, one of which is public, q, and the other private,
r, and has a population of potential students. These populations are of equal size,
and the students have a nonattendance option, n. The set of universities (and the
nonattendance option) in state s is Js = {qs , rs , ns }, and an element of Js is denoted
js .

1.3.2

Students

The student population has unit mass in each state. Students have three di↵erent
s
levels of ability in each state, so that ↵`s 2 As = {↵1s , ↵2s , . . . , ↵m
} is a student’s ability.
s
The set As is ordered so that ↵i+1
> ↵` . Ability can be interpreted a few di↵erent

ways. It could be a composite score of how desirable a student is to a university,
or just a single measurement of ability such as a student’s ACT score or their GPA.
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To maintain a consistent interpretation with my empirical results and to follow Fu
(2014)11 , I interpret ↵`s as tertiles of student’s ACT scores.
Each student has five possible choices. While a student in state s can go to any
university in either state, they can only choose the nonattendance option in their
home state. Since submitting an application is costly, each student applies only to
two universities. There are three types of student preferences that determine to which
universities they apply.
Some students want to stay close to home so they apply to universities in their
home state. The proportion of the home state only set, Ss = {ns , qs , rs }, is denoted
↵s

by ⌧S ` . I allow the proportion to vary by state and ability level, so the subscript
indicates the student preference while the superscript indicates the state and ability
of the student.
Other students only want to attend a private university, so they apply to the
two private options. I denote set of students applying only to private universities as
Rs = {ns , rs , rs0 } where s 6= s0 . The proportion of private university only students is
↵s

⌧R ` .
The final group only want to attend a public university, so they apply to two
public options with a choice set of Qs = {ns , qs , qs0 } where s 6= s0 . The proportion of
↵s

public university only student⌧Q` .
The set of student’s university choice sets for each state is:
Ks = {Ss , Rs , Qs }

(1.3)

An element of ks 2 Ks is one of the three student preference sets. A specific university
in a students choice set is denoted as js 2 ks . Figure 1.4 illustrates the application
sets for the di↵erent types of students in each state. The encircled options denote
the set of university to which that particular student set of students applies. Each
student set also has the outside option, but since the outside option doesn’t require
an application, it is not included in figure 1.4.
11

In her paper, Fu (2014) uses three di↵erent ability levels. I follow her example here.
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In defining the student preferences, I have excluded preferences like an out-of-state
only group in which students from state s would apply only to universities in state
s0 . While there is undoubtedly a set of students with these preferences, the model’s
primary goal is to explain the di↵erential institutional aid o↵ers between in-state and
out-of-state students at private universities. If I included an out-of-state only group,
both in-state and out-of-state students are applying to both of the public and private
universities in the same state. I argue that because in-state students are apply to both
public and private universities, the private university competes for these students by
o↵ering them a lower net price using higher institutional aid. If I include the out-ofstate only group, I would observe the same pricing behavior in the private university.
Since in-state students receive a relatively and significantly larger tuition reduction
at the public university compared to the private university, the institutional aid gap
between in-state and out-of-state students would still exist, though the magnitude
might be smaller. Since the out-of-state only group would not change the private
university pricing behavior, and would only serve to complicate an already complex
model, I exclude the out-of-state only group from the model.
I also exclude preferences in which students apply to more than two schools. I
exclude these preference sets for the same reason I exclude the out-of-state only group;
it would complicate an already complex model. Another way to think about excluding
certain preferences is that I am assuming the proportion of students holding those
preferences equals zero. In my numerical solution to the model, I assume that 62
percent of students have in-state only preferences, and that 19 percent of students
have either public or private university only preferences. I choose these proportions
to mirror the fact that about 80 percent of students choose to study in their home
state, and my analyses are not sensitive to small changes in these proportions. In the
proportions I have chosen, there is a large quantity of students for whom the public
and private universities are directly competing. If there were few students applying to
both the public and private universities in their home state, private universities would
not need to provide in-state students a discount since those student’s other option
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is an equally high priced private university. I want to emphasize that competing for
in-state students drives the institutional aid di↵erence between in- and out-of-state
student in private universities, so I assume that the only preferences in my model are
those in equation 1.3.
Each university has an associated price, Pjs (↵`v ) where s 2 S is the university’s
0

state and s0 2 S is the student’s state, and an associated utility, ujs (↵`s ). Both
the price and the utility a student faces at each option varies along two di↵erent

dimensions, their home state and their ability. Students from di↵erent states with
the same ability may face a di↵erent set of prices or derive di↵erent amounts of
utility depending on the location of the university. This feature allows me to capture
in-state pricing e↵ects and student geographic preferences. Similarly, students of
di↵ering abilities from the same state may face di↵erent prices and also may value
attending those universities di↵erently.
The student i’s utility for option js 2 ks is:
Ujs (↵`s ) =

ks

ln (ujs (↵`s )

Pjs (↵`s )) + ✏i,js

(1.4)

where ✏i,js is a student’s idiosyncratic preference for attending university j or nonattendance, and

ks

is a student preference specific scaling parameter. The price of

nonattendance is normalized to zero. The student’s maximization problem is
max

js 2ks 2Ks

Ujs (↵`s )

(1.5)

I assume that ✏i,js are independently and identically distributed according to the Type
1 Extreme Value distribution.12 Solving the student’s maximization problem yields
the probability that a student i chooses option js 2 ks is:
1
↵s`
js ,ks

=

(ujs (↵s` )

Pjs (↵s` )) ks
P
s
s
ks
js 2ks (ujs (↵` ) Pjs (↵` ))

0
12

if
if
if

P

(ujs (↵s` ) Pjs (↵s` ))
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ks
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>1

2 [0, 1]

(1.6)

<0

Epple et al. (2013) assume student’s idiosyncratic preference shocks take the Type 1 Extreme Value
distribution. The distributional choice is convenient because it implies smooth demand functions in
a multivariate choice problem.
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Equation 1.6 can also be thought of as the demand function for university js from
students in preference group ks .

1.3.3

Universities

There is no consensus about how to specify a university’s objective function. The
majority of universities are non-profit organizations,13 and there are many theories
about the form a non-profit firm’s objective function may take in the literature.14 The
most common choice of objective function has the university maximizing educational
quality. Epple et al. (2006), Epple et al. (2003), Epple et al. (2013), and Chade et al.
(2013) all use some measure of educational quality while Epple and Romano (1998)
uses a standard profit function to characterize private secondary schools. Groen
and White (2004) use both educational quality and revenue, but investigate each
separately. Fu (2014) includes both profit and educational quality in her objective
function, and my model follows her lead.
The price universities charge students has two components, the tuition and the
institutional aid. I assume the price a student pays, Pjs (↵`v ), takes the functional
form
0

0

Pjs (↵`s ) = tsjs
0

0

bsjs ↵`s

0

0

(1.7)
0

where tsjs is the tuition set by the university, and bsjs ↵`s is the total institutional aid
the university grants to student with ability ↵`v living in state 1. Both public and
0

private universities choose separate bsjs parameters depending on whether s = s0 or
0

not. Allowing di↵erent bsjs parameters enables universities to discriminate between inand out-of-state students. Public universities are able to choose out-of-state tuition,
0

0

tsjs when s 6= s0 , but the state government sets the in-state tuition, tsjs when s = s0 .
13

Deming et al. (2012) documents the recent increase in the share of enrollments at for-profit schools.
From 2000 to 2009 the share of enrollments increased from about 4% to nearly 11%. While the share
is increasing, it is still relatively small. It is unlikely that the for-profit universities are competing
with the more selective four year universities for students.
14
See Horwitz and Nichols (2007) and Malani et al. (2003) for summaries of the theories. Though
most reference the healthcare industry, they also apply to universities
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Though nothing prevents private universities from setting di↵erent tuitions for instate and out-of-state students, they generally set one price for everyone.15 Private
0

universities set the same tuition for in-state and out-of-state students, or tsjs |s=s0 =
0

tsjs |s6=s0 .

The theory is designed to model the long run equilibrium. Universities choose the
tuition and institutional aid variables simultaneously, and the model is static. Other
theories of the education market incorporate the application-admission-matriculation
sequence. Since I am only interested in state policy e↵ects on long run university
pricing decisions, the form of state educational policy has not changed16 and the
pricing decisions I observe span eight years,17 it is unnecessary to model the yearly
matching process.
The university welfare function in my model is:
⇧js =

X
0

↵s` |s=s0

+

↵s

0

0

0

X

0
↵s` |s6=s0

↵s

0

0

↵s

0

(✓js` · ↵`s + Pjs (↵`s )

cjs + ⇢sjs )(⌧S`
0

(✓js` · ↵`s + Pjs (↵`s )

0

0

0

↵s`
js ,Ss
↵s

0

cjs + ⇢sjs )(⌧X`s

↵s

0

+ ⌧X`s
0

↵s`
js ,Xs )

0

↵s`
js ,Xs )

F js

(1.8)

where cjs is the university specific cost parameter, Fjs is a university specific fixed
↵s

0

0

cost, ✓js` are parameters on the university’s preference for ability, ⇢sjs is the per
student state subsidy for a student, and Xs 2 {Qs , Rs }. Since private universities do
0

not receive state subsidies directly, ⇢sjs = 0 in private universities (js = rs ). Public
0

universities only receive state subsidies for in-state students, so ⇢sjs > 0 only when
↵s

0

s = s0 . The ability parameters, ✓js` , allow di↵erent marginal benefits of increasing
the university’s share of each di↵erent ability level. Since universities have both fixed
costs and endowments, Fjs can be negative or positive. I normalize Fjs = 0 since I am
interested in university pricing decisions, not entry and exit decisions. The objective
function incorporates a nonlinear preference for student ability as well as profit. Fu
15

It could be the case that private universities give a lump sum discount that favors either in-state
or out-of-state students.
16
The form of state support has not changed drastically over the years I observe though the level of
state support may have, especially between 2008 and 2012.
17
I observe data in 2004, 2008, and 2012.
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uses nonlinear preferences for ability, and my functional form is similar to hers. She
also includes a nonlinear preference for profit, which I do not include.
An important feature of the university welfare function, ⇧js , is that it takes the
same form for universities in both sectors. This di↵ers from Epple et al. (2013) since
public university tuition and institutional aid is set exogenously in their model, while
private universities have an exogenous tuition cap and choose institutional aid. While
the parameter values in my model may di↵er between the sectors and universities, the
functional form cannot by itself explain why private universities favor in-state students
when awarding institutional aid. The di↵erence emerges from student preferences for
universities. University js competes with a di↵erent set of universities, depending
on whether the student is in-state or out-of-state. For example, take the private
university in state 1, university r1 . For in-state students, university r1 believes some
portion of those students want to stay in state 1. The in-state student’s choice set
is either {n1 , q1 , r1 } or {n1 , r1 , r2 }, and if a large enough portion of students want to
stay in their home state, r1 ’s main competitor is the in-state public university q1 . For
out-of-state students, university r1 believes those students prefer to attend a private
university. The choice set for those students is {n2 , r1 , r2 }, with r2 competing directly
with r1 for those students. Since university r1 has a di↵erent set of competitors
depending on the student’s home state, they may o↵er di↵erent prices to in-state
and out-of-state students. Since in-state tuition is substantially lower than tuition at
private universities, in-state tuition drives this di↵erence.
The public university’s maximization problem is:

0

0

max

0

{tsjs ,bsjs |s6=s0 },{bsjs |s=s0 }

⇧q s

(1.9)

and the private university’s maximization problem is:

0

max

0

0

{bsjs |s6=s0 },{bjk |s(i,j)=1},tsjs |s6=s0 =tsjs |s=s0

Now, I will define and discuss the equilibrium.

⇧rs

(1.10)
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1.3.4

Equilibrium

The exogenous components of my model are:
1. The number of students, and the proportion of students holding preferences for
home, private or public universities
2. The set of universities, Js = {qs , rs }8s 2 S
↵s

3. The set of student utility for each university, {uns (↵` ` ), ujs (↵`s )}8js 2 ks 2 Ks
4. The distribution of ✏i,js for js 2 ks 2 Ks , and the distribution of ↵`s
5. The forms of the student utility function and the university welfare function,
↵s

0

0

6. The parameters ✓js` , ⇢js , cjs , and tsqs |s=s0 = Tqss , the in-state tuition.
0

0

An equilibrium is defined as a set of tuition and institutional aid parameters {tsjs , bsjs |s =
↵s`
js ,ks ,

s0 [ s 6= s0 }8js 2 Js and student choice probabilities,

that maximizes public

0

university’s welfare subject to the constraint tsqs |s=s0 = Tqss 8s 2 S , maximizes private
0

0

university’s welfare subject to the constraint tsjs |s6=s0 = tsjs |s=s0 8s 2 S , and maximizes
student’s utility.
0

The first order condition (FOC) with respect to tsjs when s 6= s0 for a public
university is:
X ↵s0
@⇧js
=
⌧Qs`
0
@tsjs
s0
0

0

↵s`
js ,Qs

+

↵s
(✓js`

0

↵` |s6=s

s0

s0

· ↵` + Pjs (↵` )

cjs +

↵s
⇢js )⌧Qs`
s0

0

@

0

↵s`
js ,Qs
0
@tsjs

=0

(1.11)

Public universities do not have an in-state tuition FOC, since it is set by the state.
Private universities choose one tuition variable for both in- and out-of-state students,
0

so the private tuition FOC is summed over ↵`s when s = s0 and when s 6= s0 . I
0

have included the state subsidy, ⇢sjs , in equation 1.11 even though the state subsidy is
nonzero only for in-state public university students, whose tuition is set exogenously.
0

The FOC for a public university when s 6= s0 with respect to bsjs is:
X
@⇧js
=
0
@bsjs
s0

↵` |s6=s0

s0

↵` ·

↵s
⌧Qs`

0

0

↵s`
js ,Qs

+

↵s
(✓js`

0

s0

s0

· ↵` + Pjs (↵` ) + ⇢js

cjs )

@

0

↵s`
js ,Qs
0
@bsjs

= 0 (1.12)
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While equation 1.12 is the FOC for out-of-state students, the FOC for in-state students is similar except that there are two summed proportion and demand terms,
0

⌧ · . Private universities have an FOC with respect to bsjs as in equation 1.12, except
that Rs is substituted for Qs . The state subsidy, ⇢js , is nonzero only in the public
0

in-state university’s FOC with respect to bsjs , though I have included it in equation
1.12 for completeness. It is useful to note that

@

0
↵s
`
js ,Qs
0
@tsjs

and

0
↵s
`
js ,Qs

@

@bjk

are both functions

of utility values and prices.
Due to the nonlinearity of

0

↵s`
js ,Xs ,

a closed form solution for the twelve choice vari-

ables does not exist. Also, there are multiple equilibria depending on the relationship
between the parameters. Using the NPSAS and the IPEDS, I have data on the tuition, institutional aid variables, cost per student, and state subsidies per student,
as well as ACT score data. I treat these as known, and use three student ability
↵s

0

levels. The parameters {ujs (↵`s )} and ✓js` are unknown. I construct a reasonable set
of parameters that support the observed price variables as an equilibrium. Tables 1.5
and 1.6 contains the parameters I use to calibrate my model.
First, I calculate student utility parameters. In the model, each student chooses
between three options. For simplicity, I will call these options {u0 , u1 , u2 } with associated prices {p1 , p2 } and p0 = 0. The prices are known. I treat the share of students,
{s0 , s1 , s2 }, in each school as known and used the NPSAS to calculate the shares. The
shares di↵er across the three preference types of students, and I’ve set them to be
symmetric across states. Shares can be seen in table 1.5. I also treat u0 , the utility of
the outside option, as known.18 When calculating the share of students in each group
choosing the outside option, I use the number of students attending a two year public
college and interpret the outside option as students attending a two year college. I
have set the value of the outside option to be the same for each student regardless of
their type or ability.
18

The utility of the outside option can also be viewed as the average surplus a student receives from
choosing the outside option.
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Table 1.5 shows what percentage of students of each type choose the three possible
options. I calculate these percentages for three ability levels using the NPSAS. The
ability levels are the average ACT score for the bottom, middle, and top third of
students in the ACT distribution, so each ability level includes the same number of
students. For each of the three types, the percentage choosing the outside option
decreases as ability increases. For in-state only students and public only students,
more students choose the in-state public university than their other option. A larger
percentage of the private only students choose to attend their out-of-state university
option, as opposed to attending their in-state option.
To calculate utility, I set the probability that a student chooses option 1, which
follows from equation 1.6, to the share of students in that sector, s0 . That is:
(u1 p1 )
u0 + (u1 p1 ) + (u2

p2 )

= s1

(1.13)

I omit the ability variable for the student and any variability in the scaling parameter,
, to simplify notation. The probabilities that the student chooses options 0 or 2 are
similar, and the denominator is the same for each probability. I solve for u1 and u2
by taking the ratios s1 /s0 and s2 /s0 . The solution, in terms of the shares, u0 , and
prices, for u1 is:
u1 =

✓

s1 · u0
s0

◆1

+ p1

(1.14)

and the solution for u2 is similar. Since the terms on the right side of equation
1.14 are all known and equation 1.14 applies to all levels of student ability, utility is
calculated separately for every option and for every student ability level. The surplus
of choosing option 1 in equation 1.14 is:
u1

p1 =

✓

s1 · u 0
s0

◆1

Holding p1 constant, students will be less elastic with respect to net price changes
as u0 increases, as

decreases, or as the ratio

s1
s0

increases. In table 1.5, I calculate

the share of students choosing each option by ability level for each of the three types
of students. Regardless of the type of student, the ratio

s1
s0

is increasing in ability.
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All else equal, the increasing ratio

s1
s0

means that low ability students will be more

responsive to price changes than high ability students, and I find that low ability
students are more price sensitive in my theoretical results.
Using the utilities computed from equation 1.14 and the prices, I am able to calculate

@

0
↵s
`
js ,Xs
0
@tsjs

and

@

0
↵s
`
js ,Xs
0
@bsjs

from equations 1.11 and 1.12. The only unknown quantities
↵s

0

left in the FOCs now are the parameters on ability, ✓js` . Since I am using three ability
levels to calibrate the model, there are three ability parameters. Each university now
has three FOCs and the three unknown parameters are linearly related, so a solution
exists that satisfies the FOCs.
Finally, it is necessary to check the second order conditions. Since there are no
longer any unknown parameters, it is simple to compute the Hessian matrices for
each university, all of which are negative definite. My model supports an equilibrium
in which private universities price discriminate in favor of in-state students when
calibrated to reasonable parameters.

1.4

Theoretical Applications and Comparative Statics
↵s

0

My model can compute the ability value parameters, ✓js` , by sector. The equilibrium prices used to compute the parameters are in table 1.6. I have set the initial
prices to be symmetric for public and private universities across states {1, 2}.
The higher education industry has been going through considerable changes. Figure 1.1 shows the average in-state tuition in Big Ten university states from 1995
to 2009. Around 2003, in-state tuition began an upward trend. Some states, like
Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin, stopped this upward trend, while other states, like
Minnesota and Illinois, let it continue. Knowing how students and other competing
universities respond to changes in public in-state tuition is of great interest to state
legislatures as well as universities. Similarly, many states have been decreasing the
amount of support they provide to universities. Wisconsin made especially deep cuts
in state support to the University of Wisconsin in 2015.
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Focusing on Indiana and Illinois, while Illinois has allowed there in-state tuition
to increase, Indiana has not. From 2006 to 2013, the percentage of people in Indiana
between ages 17 and 25 attending a public university rose from about 41.5 percent19
to about 44.1 percent. Over the same time frame, the percentage of people in Illinois
attending a public university rose from 40.9 percent to just 41.9 percent. Illinois’
in-state tuition increased relative to Indiana’s, and Indiana saw a larger increase
in students attending public universities. In both state, people attending private
universities has remained relatively constant.
The State Higher Education Finance Report by Pernsteiner and Blake (2016)
documents that state appropriations per student in public institutions have fallen
over the years. From 2006 to 2013, state appropriation per student fell from $7,899
to $6,260. From 2008 to 2015, state appropriations per student in Illinois rose by
38.2 percent while they fell in Indiana by 8 percent. Appropriations by student
fell by 15.3 percent on average from 2008 to 2015. Though neither the American
Community Survey nor the State Higher Education Finance Report directly address
whether a student is in-state or out-of-state, the di↵erences by state in the higher
education landscape in tuition and state level appropriations change over time and
my theory is able to address those changes.
While not much is known about the e↵ect of cuts in subsidies to universities,
there are many studies on tuition elasticity. Curs and Singell (2002) find that instate students are less responsive to net price changes than out-of-state students at
the University of Oregon. They also find that the elasticity depends on when you
begin observing the student in the application-admission-enrollment process. Students are much more elastic if you account for the entire process since students are
less committed to a university during the application phase. Curs and Singell control
for competitor’s price in their estimates using the average price of all universities
across the country. Hemelt and Marcotte (2011) find tuition elasticities of about -0.1
19

I calculate these numbers using the American Community Survey (ACS) from the Census. I use
2006 and 2013 as benchmark years because the ACS sampling changed between 2005 and 2006 and
2013 is the latest currently available year.
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and use averages of community college tuition and private university tuition to control for competitor’s prices.20 Tuition elasticities at private universities are less well
understood than at public universities.
My theoretical model provides a general equilibrium framework which predicts
how prices, student shares, and the average ability of each university’s student body
change across di↵erent states and sectors in response to changes in tuition, state
subsidies, and demand. Using the parameters calculated in the previous section, I
examine the e↵ects of $1,000 decrease in state 1’s public in-state tuition, a $1,000
decrease in state 1’s per in-state student subsidy to their public university, and a 5
percent increase in demand.21

1.4.1

Net Price Changes by Ability Level
0

In some of the comparative static results I present, the tuition, tsjs , and the insti0

tutional aid parameter, bsjs , move in the same direction. Because there is more than
one ability level, the direction of the net price change for each ability level is not
immediately obvious when both price parameters move in the same direction. If both
price parameters move in the opposite direction, the direction of the net price change
for students of all ability levels is immediately obvious. Since universities use these
two price parameters to determine the ability composition of their student body, the
two parameters rarely move in the opposite directions.22 I derive the direction the
net price changes for all possible changes in the price parameters.

20

Identifying the relevant set of competitor’s tuitions has generally been ignored, and is an area for
future research.
21
I calculate a 5 percent increase in demand by decreasing the value of the outside option by 5
percent.
22
In fact, the two parameters never move in opposite directions in the examples I discuss.
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The change in the net price for a student when tuition and aid change in the same
direction is given by:
P (↵) = P2 (↵)

P1 (↵) = (t2

b2 ↵)

(t1

b1 ↵) =

t

b↵

(1.15)

where a subscript 1 denotes the initial values, and a subscript 2 denotes the values
after the exogenous shock. I omit subscripts indicating the type of university and student to avoid notational clutter and because equation 1.15 applies to all universities.
If

t > 0 and

b > 0, the direction of the change is given by:
P (↵)

and if

t < 0 and

t
b

(1.16)

(<) ↵

b < 0, the direction of the change is given by:
P (↵)

If

(<) 0 if

(<) 0 if

t
b

(1.17)

 (>) ↵

b = 0, the direction of the net price change is given by the sign of

the direction of the net price change is given by the sign of

t. If

t = 0,

b.

Equation 1.16 shows that when both price parameters are increasing, students
with an ability below

t
b

face a net price increase. In other words, when both tuition

and institutional aid are increasing, low ability students will face a net price increase.
Equation 1.17 shows that when both price parameters are decreasing, students with
an ability greater than

t
b

will face a net price increase. Universities choose their

student body composition changes by deciding the direction and magnitude of both
t and

1.4.2

b.

Decreasing Public In-State Tuition

An exogenous decrease in state 1’s public in-state tuition a↵ects all the universities
in my model. In table 1.7, I calculate the percent change in both price parameters,
the share of students at each ability level along with the total change in the share
of students, the change in the average ability of the student body, and the change in
university welfare23 in response to a $1,000 decrease in state 1’s in-state tuition.
23

University welfare is calculated using equation 1.8
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E↵ect on Individual Universities
The $1,000 decrease in state 1’s in-state tuition causes state 1’s public university
to decrease their in-state institutional aid parameter, bj by 46.5 percent or by $48.83.
Using equation 1.17, in-state students with an ability level greater than

tj
bj

=

$1,000
$47.90

=

20.48 will see an increase in their net price and students with an ability lower than
20.48 see a decrease in net price. In fact, we see that an increase in the share of
students with ability level ↵` = 17 and decreases in the shares of student with ability
levels ↵` = 22 and ↵` = 27. Out-of-state tuition increased by $14 and out-of-state aid
increased by $0.515. Using equation 1.16, out-of-state students with an ability level
less than

tj
bj

=

$14
$0.515

= 27.18 see a net price increase. Since all students in my model

have an ability level less than 27.18, all out-of-state students see a price increase
and the share of out-of-state students decreases. State 1’s public university increases
their share of low ability in-state students and decreases their share of high ability
in-state students by their endogenous response of changing their in-state institutional
aid parameter. The average ability of their students decreases, but the university’s
welfare increases by a small amount due to the large increase in the share of low
ability students.
State 1’s private university competes for students directly with state 1’s public
university. The private university responds to the decreased public in-state tuition
by increasing their tuition, tj , and both in-state and out-of-state institutional aid
parameters, bj . The out-of-state aid parameter increases by more than the in-state
aid parameter, meaning that out-of-state students with an ability level less than 21
see a net price increase while in-state students with an ability level less than 22.8 see a
net price increase. Both in-state and out-of-state low ability student shares decrease,
while middle and high ability student shares increase. The average ability of students
at state 1’s private university increases, as does the university’s welfare. Note that
even though in-state middle ability students see a net price increase, the share of
middle ability in-state students actually increases. In-state students are composed of
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students that apply only to the in-state universities and students that apply only to
the private universities. State 1’s middle ability students see price increases in all of
their options, other than the outside option. Since the net price increases are di↵erent
magnitudes, some middle ability students will choose a di↵erent university after the
decrease in the tuition. In my parameterization of the model, a larger share of state
1’s middle ability students choose their home state’s private university.
State 2’s public university also competes for students directly with state 1’s public
university. State 2’s public university responds to the decrease in their competitor’s
in-state tuition by increasing both their tuition, tj , and their institutional aid parameter, bj , for out-of-state students. The increases in their out-of-state tuition and
institutional aid parameter means that out-of-state students will see a net price increase if there ability level is less than 21.8. State 2’s share of low ability out-of-state
students decreases, while their share of middle and high ability out-of-state students
increases. The in-state institutional aid parameter increases. Since in-state universities cannot change in-state tuition, the institutional aid parameter increase causes
net price to fall for in-state students of all abilities. Even though the net price is
falling for all in-state students, state 2’s public university sees decreases in the shares
of low and middle ability students. State 2’s private university is also decreasing low
and middle ability student’s net price, and the public universities price decrease is not
large enough to compete for the students at the margin. State 2’s public university
sees a decrease in its total share of students, but the average ability of its student
body increases.
State 2’s private university does not directly compete with state 1’s public university for students, so the decrease in state 1’s public in-state tuition does not directly
e↵ect their prices. State 2’s private university does compete directly with both state
1’s private university and state 2’s public university, both of whom change their
prices. The direct responses by state 2’s public university and state 1’s private university dampen the reaction of the private university in state 2. The tuition and
institutional aid parameters for state 2’s private university are decreasing for both in-
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and out-of-state students. All out-of-state students see a net price increase, though
only in-state students with abilities greater than 23.5 see a net price increase. Low
and middle ability shares increase, while high ability shares decrease at state 2’s private university. Their total share of students increases, though the average ability of
their student body decreases.

E↵ects on States
Whether decreasing in-state tuition is a net positive or net negative change depends upon the objective of the state. Suppose the state cares about increasing the
human capital productivity in their state. Decreasing the in-state tuition causes more
students to attend a four year university, but those are all low ability students. My
model predicts that decreasing in-state tuition increases the number of middle and
high ability students attending a four year university. Whether the productivity of
the human capital stock increases or decreases in response to the in-state tuition decrease is beyond the scope of this paper, but if you believe the gains to education
depends on a student’s ability, my model suggests that decreasing in-state tuition has
a non-zero e↵ect on the stock of human capital productivity.
My model also shows that a state unilaterally decreasing their in-state tuition
also decreases the share of students attending a university in their neighboring state.
While I only model university competition here, the interstate e↵ects of my model
suggest that state governments should also be acting strategically when setting tuition policies. Groen and White (2004) study the di↵erent objectives between public
universities and state governments, but they do not consider if states set tuition policies to compete with each other. My model can be extended to study competition
for human capital stock between states.
From the university’s perspective, the public and private universities in state 1
both see a welfare gain as a result of state 1 decreasing in-state tuition, with the
public university gaining the most. State 2’s universities both experience a welfare
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decrease. If the state legislature cares about their state’s universities welfare, then
my model suggests that decreasing in-state tuition increases their state’s universities
welfare at the expense of their neighboring state’s universities welfare.

A Symmetric vs Asymmetric Decrease in In-state Tuition
So far in section 1.4.2 I have focused on an asymmetric decrease in in-state tuition in which only state 1’s public university decreases their in-state tuition. Table
1.8 shows how the public and private universities in both states respond if both
state governments decide to decrease their public in-state tuitions by $1,000. In the
asymmetric case shown in table 1.7, state 2’s private university makes only small adjustments to their prices. In the symmetric case, state 2’s private university adjusts
their prices in a similar magnitude and direction to state 1’s private university in the
asymmetric case.
In general, the results for both state’s public and private universities in the symmetric case is very similar to state 1’s public and private university results in the
asymmetric case. The largest divergence is that in the symmetric case, state 1’s public university adjusts its out-of-state tuition at a much larger magnitude than it does
in the asymmetric case. In the symmetric case, the both state’s public universities
adjust their out-of-state student prices in a similar direction and magnitude as state
2’s public university in the asymmetric case. In the asymmetric case, the state 1’s
public university is only competing with state 2’s public university for out-of-state
students. Since state 2’s public university makes only small adjustments to their instate prices, state 1’s public university has no incentive to make large changes in their
out-of-state net tuition in the asymmetric case. In the symmetric case, both public
universities make large net tuition changes for their in-state students, causing both
public universities to adjust their out-of-state net tuition to remain competitive.
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1.4.3

Decreasing the State Subsidy

States also provide subsidies to public universities in my model. Recently, states
have been reducing the amount of those subsidies to universities. In table 1.9, I
calculate the percent change in both price parameters, the share of students at each
ability level along with the total change in the share of students, the change in the
average ability of the student body, and the change in university welfare in response
to a $1,000 decrease in the state subsidy per in-state student.

E↵ect on Individual Universities
State 1’s public university is directly e↵ected when the state subsidy per in-state
student decreases by $1,000. The decrease in the subsidy is a loss of revenue to
the university. To compensate for the loss in revenue, the university decreases the
in-state institutional aid parameter to increase net price for all in-state students. Instate student shares all decrease as a result of the net price increase. The university
also decreases the out-of-state tuition and institutional aid parameters, decreasing net
price for students of all ability levels. These decreases are relatively small compared
to the change in in-state net price, and the resulting increase in out-of-state student
shares of all ability are also relatively small. Overall, the total share of students in
state 1’s public university decreases. The average ability at the university increases,
though, since low ability students are the most responsive to the net price increase.
Due to the decrease in the state 1’s subsidies to the public university, state 1’s
private university decreases their tuition, tj , and both in- and out-of-state institutional
aid parameters, bj , to compete for in-state students. The price parameter changes
cause net prices to rise for in-state students with an ability greater than 24.4 and prices
to rise for out-of-state students with an ability greater than 20.9. In other words, state
1’s private university is raising net prices for high ability in-state students, and middle
and high ability out-of-state students. In-state student shares of all ability levels are
increasing, even though high ability students are being charged a higher price. Low
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ability shares of out-of-state students are increasing, while both middle and high
ability student shares are decreasing. The private university gains in total share of
students, but sees a decrease in the student body’s average ability.
State 2’s public university also directly competes for students with state 1’s public
university, and responds to state 1’s reaction to the decrease in subsidies by increasing
the net price for all of its in-state students, and decreasing the tuition and institutional
aid parameters for out-of-state students. The reduction in tuition and aid parameters
causes increases in net prices for students with an ability greater than 23.2. Their
share of out-of-state students increase for all ability levels, even though high ability
out-of-state students see a net price increase. They also gain in low and middle ability
in-state student shares, but see a decrease in their high in-state student ability share.
Their total share of students increases, due mostly to a gain in out-of-state students.
The average ability of their student body decreases.
State 2’s private university does not directly compete for students with state 1’s
public university. However, since they compete for students with both state 1’s private
university and state 2’s public university, state 2’s private university responds to those
universities’ changing prices. State 2’s private university increase tuition and both
in- and out-of-state institutional aid parameters. These increases results in net price
increases for in-state students with an ability less than 23.5 and out-of-state students
with an ability less than 14. In other words, low and middle ability in-state students
see a net price increase, while out-of-state students all see a net price decrease. Both
in- and out-of-state low and middle ability student shares both decrease, even though
the out-of-state students see net price decreases. The total share of students at state
2’s private university is decreasing and the average ability of the student body is
increasing.
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E↵ects on States
Comparing the welfare impact on the universities, state 1’s public university su↵ers
a relatively large welfare loss. All other universities in my model see a small welfare
increase. If state legislatures care about the welfare of the universities, my model
predicts that decreasing state subsidies is detrimental to public universities and that
the welfare loss at the public university is not compensated for by welfare increases
at other universities.
My model also predicts that the share of students not attending a four year university increases. The increase in nonattendance is especially prevalent among low
ability students. The average ability of students not attending is increasing. If state
legislatures believe that attending a four year university increases the productivity of
their workforce, then decreasing the share of students attending a four year university
by decreasing the state subsidy is not in their interest.

1.4.4

Increasing Demand for Higher Education

In the previous two examples, changes in state policy shock the public university
in state 1 and those shocks spread throughout the higher education system. Using the
American Community Survey, I find that in 2000 nearly 52 percent of 18 to 22 year
olds were not enrolled in any sort of educational institution. In 2013, only 40 percent
of 18 to 22 year olds were not enrolled in an educational institution. By decreasing
the value of the outside option, I use my model to examine the e↵ects of an increase in
demand for higher education. I decrease the outside option by 5 percent for students
in both state 1 and state 2, so demand increase a↵ects the two states symmetrically.
These results may be found in table 1.10.
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E↵ect on Individual Universities
In response to the demand increase, the public universities decrease the in-state
institutional aid parameter bj , increasing the net price for all in-state students. They
also decrease the out-of-state tuition and institutional aid parameters so that high
ability out-of-state students see a net price increase, while low and middle ability
out-of-state students see a net price decrease. In-state student shares all decrease due
to the net price increase. Low and middle ability out-of-state student shares increase,
while high ability student shares decrease. Their total share of in-state students
decreases while their share of out-of-state students increases. The average ability of
in-state students increases while out-of-state student average ability decreases.
Private universities respond to the increase in demand by decreasing tuition, tj ,
and decreasing both in- and out-of-state institutional aid parameters, bj . All in-state
students see a decrease in net price while all out-of-state students see an increase in net
price. Consequently, private universities increase their share of in-state students and
decrease their share of out-of-state students. The average ability of in-state students
decreases while the average ability of out-of-state students increases.

E↵ects on States
Due to the increase in demand, there are fewer students not attending a four year
university. The decrease in nonattendance is smaller than the demand increase since
net prices are generally increasing, though some out-of-state public university students
do see net price decreases. Low ability students entering four year universities drive
the decrease in nonattendance, since some of both middle and high ability students
are actually choosing not to attend due to net price increases.
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1.5

Conclusion
Private universities o↵er $295 per ACT point to in-state students but just $166

per point to out-of-state students. Since private universities have no incentive to discriminate between in- and out-of-state students, I create a general equilibrium model
to explain why private universities use institutional aid to favor in-state students.
In-state tuition and student preferences for a university’s sector or location drives
private universities to set prices favorable to in-state students.
If private universities did not compete with public universities for students, then
the aid gap between in- and out-of-state students at private universities would not
exist. As long as in-state applicants include students who prefer to stay in their home
state, and do not apply out of state, a private university knows their only competition
for that set of students comes from the public university. Since state governments
set public in-state tuition below the market rate and the pool of in- and out-ofstate applicants di↵er, private universities respond by decreasing the net price paid
by in-state students and increasing prices paid by out-of-state students. Since they
advertise the same tuition regardless of a student’s home state, private universities
decrease the net price by o↵ering more institutional aid to in-state students.
I use the model to study a decrease in one state’s public in-state tuition, a decrease
in one state’s subsidies to its public university, and an increase in demand for higher
education. My model predicts that decreasing in-state tuition a↵ects not just the
public university in which the decrease occurs, but also the universities that compete
directly and indirectly with that public university. Decreasing in-state tuition in one
state increases students enrolled in four year universities in both states in my model.
Decreasing subsidies to a public university also a↵ects universities and students across
state lines, decreasing the number of students in both states enrolled in a public
university.
My model currently takes state policy decisions as exogenous. Though it is beyond
the scope of this paper, I can extend the model to endogenize policy decisions and
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analyze the strategic interaction between governments under di↵erent state government objective functions. My model also predicts private university price responses
to increases in public universities’ tuition. I plan on testing these hypotheses in future
papers.
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Table 1.1.: Summary Statistics

Public

Private

In-State

Out-of-State

In-State

Out-of-State

3,577 (3,769)

7,593 (7,017)

10,730 (7,050)

12,873 (8,728)

% with Aid

28.6

35.3

76.7

67.4

ACT Score

22.4 (4.36)

23.1 (4.56)

23.1 (4.69)

24.8 (5.06)

EFC

11,490 (15,536)

16,739 (19,103)

12,680 (17,259)

18,559 (21,469)

Income

71,316 (64,610)

95,046 (78,558)

78,227 (71,492)

104,436 (89,011)

% Dependent

80.7

89.6

85.8

92.3

% Nonwhite

31.3

29.8

28.6

28.4

% Female

53.4

49.7

58.2

53.5

44,250

5,320

18,120

10,370

Very Selective

6,844 (3,267)

18,618 (8,227)

27,997 (11,056)

Mod. Selective

5,768 (2,624)

14,205 (7,416)

21,556 (8,711)

Min. Selective

4,786 (2,353)

9,838 (5,344)

20,035 (10,381)

Institutional Aid

Number of Obs

Tuition:

Enrollments:
Very Selective

25,989 (13,733)

11,412 (10,232)

Mod. Selective

19,204 (11,643)

4,822 (4,740)

Min. Selective

11,114 (7,238)

3,202 (3,059)

Standard deviations in parentheses. All dollar values are in 2012 dollars.
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Table 1.2.: Comparing marginal e↵ects of the ACT score on institutional aid between
the OLS and Tobit models

Dependent Var: Institutional Aid
OLS

IS Public ACT

OS Public ACT

Tobit

OLS

Latent

Conditional

(1)

(2)

(3)

128.4***

439.8***

107.3***

(9.081)

(22.67)

(5.822)

Di↵erence

IS Private ACT

OS Private ACT

345.6***

434.3***

237.6***

(23.24)

(30.78)

(18.45)

Di↵erence

Observations

78,030

78,030

78,030

Tobit
Latent

Conditional

(4)

(5)

(6)

121.8***

442.5***

105.5***

(8.447)

(22.59)

(5.663)

141.8***

349.6***

102.7***

(24.88)

(47.97)

(14.36)

19.94

-92.82**

-2.81

(23.15)

(46.11)

(13.55)

419.4***

531.3***

294.5***

(20.80)

(27.86)

(16.97)

240.1***

304.7***

166.0***

(34.55)

(46.58)

(26.00)

-179.4***

-226.7***

-128.5***

(31.52)

(42.48)

(22.97)

78,030

78,030

78,030

IS = In-State. OS = Out-of-State. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by unitid
and year. Other variables controlled for include: gender, race, income, expected
family contribution (used in federal financial aid calculations), dependency status,
selectivity of university, year, state of university, and enrollment size of university.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.3.: Conditional Tobit model estimates of ACT e↵ects on institutional aid for
di↵erent samples

Dependent variable: Institutional Aid:

IS Public ACT

OS Public ACT

Di↵erence

IS Private ACT

OS Private ACT

Di↵erence

Observations

Very

Moderately

Minimally

All

Selective

Selective

Selective

Dependents

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

105.5***

110.5***

93.55***

94.02***

122.9***

(5.663)

(12.65)

(6.143)

(10.16)

(6.400)

102.7***

121.1***

104.0***

45.40

120.4***

(14.36)

(30.01)

(18.26)

(34.96)

(15.87)

-2.81

10.56

10.43

-48.62

-2.54

(13.55)

(28.2)

(17.51)

(34.56)

(15.03)

294.5***

273.0***

326.5***

196.1***

314.6***

(16.97)

(38.58)

(17.36)

(26.85)

(19.64)

166.0***

147.7***

261.4***

101.9*

167.7***

(26.00)

(39.81)

(26.84)

(53.26)

(28.28)

-128.5***

-125.3***

-65.04**

-94.15*

-146.9***

(22.97)

(40.58)

(26.41)

(56.62)

(24.74)

78,030

23,700

45,010

9,320

65,560

IS = In-State. OS = Out-of-State. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
unitid and year. Other variables controlled for include: gender, race, income,
expected family contribution (used in federal financial aid calculations), dependency
status, selectivity of university, year, state of university, and enrollment size of
university. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4.: Conditional Tobit model estimates by region

South

West

Northeast

Midwest

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

103.2***

62.19***

111.3***

116.9***

(7.059)

(10.14)

(15.98)

(12.77)

111.6***

3.474

161.2***

95.35***

(24.33)

(27.95)

(29.07)

(25.71)

8.42

-59.23**

50.19*

-21.44

(23.27)

(27.16)

(27.71)

(23.41)

358.8***

203.8***

271.9***

311.3***

(31.83)

(34.60)

(34.60)

(21.60)

294.8***

188.5***

36.69

301.9***

(43.03)

(38.49)

(40.46)

(48.84)

-63.52

-14.44

-235.2***

-7.79

(49.4)

(45.56)

(34.99)

(45.4)

26,630

12,750

18,430

19,690

Public:
In-State ACT

Out-of-state ACT

Di↵erence

Private:
In-state ACT

Out-of-state ACT

Di↵erence

Observations

IS = In-State. OS = Out-of-State. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
unitid and year. Other variables controlled for include: gender, race, income,
expected family contribution (used in federal financial aid calculations), dependency
status, selectivity of university, year, state of university, and enrollment size of
university. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5.: Values used to calibrate and numerically solve the theoretical model for
students

Students:
Student Options
In-State Only Percentages:
Outside

Public IS

Private IS

↵` = 17

49

38

13

↵` = 22

28

53

19

↵` = 27

17

56

27

Outside

Public IS

Public OS

↵` = 17

46

34

20

↵` = 22

25

47

28

↵` = 27

14

48

38

= 0.7, ⌧ = 0.62

Public Only Percentages:

= 0.8, ⌧ = 0.19

Private Only Percentages:
Outside

Private IS Private OS

↵` = 17

55

14

31

↵` = 22

30

20

50

↵` = 27

11

17

72

= 0.8, ⌧ = 0.19
IS stands for in-state. OS stands for out-of-state. There is mass
level. The

1
3

of each ability

is the scaling parameter, and the ⌧ is the proportion of students of that

type. The utility of the outside option is 1,000.
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Table 1.6.: Values used to calibrate and numerically solve the theoretical model for
universities

Universities:
Public
IS Tuition (tj )

$6,000

OS Tuition (tj )

$14,000

Private
$20,000

IS Aid (bj )

$105

$295

OS Aid (bj )

$103

$166

Cost (cj )

$40,000

$50,000

Subsidy (⇢j )

$12,000

IS stands for in-state. OS stands for out-of-state. There is mass
level. The

1
3

of each ability

is the scaling parameter, and the ⌧ is the proportion of students of that

type. The utility of the outside option is 1,000.

6.18

-46.5

-16.67

6.18

0.005

0.001

1.9

1.1

0.37

1.9

2.12

0.37

(4)

Avg Ability

-2.53

↵` = 27

%

-1.15

↵` = 22

-0.96

1.85

12.4

↵` = 17

0.001

-0.004

-0.001

-0.003

-0.011

0.84

-1.59

2.1

0.44

-10.9

0.101

-0.32

0.053

0.054

-1.78

in share of students by ability ( j (↵` )):

Total Share

%

Aid (bj )

Uni. Welfare

%

Tuition (tj )

%

%

%

(2)

(1)

(3)

IS

OS

IS

OS

Private 1

Public 1

0.005

-0.015

0.008

-0.003

-0.065

-1.19

0.007

0

(5)

IS

1.36

-2.01

3.67

1.39

-17.6

-1.19

12.6

2.02

(6)

OS

Public 2

-0.07

0.23

-0.067

0.013

1.06

-0.28

-0.104

-0.036

(7)

IS

-0.07

0.17

-0.12

0.007

1.12

-0.28

-0.276

-0.036

(8)

OS

Private 2

0.08

-0.19

0.19

0.18

-0.81

(9)

1

di↵erent ability levels.

welfare is calculated using equation 1.8 and the total share of students is calculated by summing the shares of the three

levels, 17, 22, and 27, are comparable to the lower, middle, and top terciles of the ACT score distribution. University

and ability level ↵` . The percent change in the share of students enrolled is separated by ability, ↵` , and the three ability

bj ↵` for university j

0.06

-0.15

0.13

0.1

-0.58

(10)

2

Not Attend

All values are percent changes. Tuition and aid are the parameters in the price function, Pj (↵` ) = tj

students.

Table 1.7.: The e↵ect of a $1,000 decrease in state 1’s in-state tuition on tuition, enrollment, and the average ability of
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5.0

-46.5

-16.67

5.0

12.59

2.03

(2)

(1)

1.61

1.01

0.34

(3)

IS

OS

IS

1.61

1.86

0.34

(4)

OS

Private 1

Public 1

-0.95

1.36

-2.02

3.67

1.39

-17.58

0.77

-1.37

2.03

0.45

-9.89

0.03

-0.15

-0.07

0.06

-0.68

-0.95

1.84

-2.52

-1.15

12.3

5.0

-46.5

-16.67

(5)

IS

1.36

-2.02

3.67

1.39

-17.58

5.0

12.59

2.03

(6)

OS

Public 2

0.77

-1.37

2.03

0.45

-9.89

1.61

1.01

0.34

(7)

IS

0.03

-0.15

-0.07

0.06

-0.68

1.61

1.86

0.34

(8)

OS

Private 2

0.19

0.17

-0.76

(10)

2

0.08

di↵erent ability levels.

welfare is calculated using equation 1.8 and the total share of students is calculated by summing the shares of the three

levels, 17, 22, and 27, are comparable to the lower, middle, and top terciles of the ACT score distribution. University

and ability level ↵` . The percent change in the share of students enrolled is separated by ability, ↵` , and the three ability

bj ↵` for university j

0.08

-0.17 -0.17

0.19

0.17

-0.76

(9)

1

Not Attend

All values are percent changes. Tuition and aid are the parameters in the price function, Pj (↵` ) = tj

Avg Ability

-2.52

↵` = 27

%

-1.15

↵` = 22

1.84

12.3

↵` = 17

in share of students by ability ( j (↵` )):

Total Share

%

Aid (bj )

Uni. Welfare

%

Tuition (tj )

%

%

%

ability of students.

Table 1.8.: The e↵ect of a $1,000 decrease in state 1 and state 2’s in-state tuition on tuition, enrollment, and the average
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-38.9

-10.9

0

-38.9

-0.004

-0.001

(2)

(1)

0.61

-0.75

-0.27

(3)

IS

OS

IS

0.61

-1.55

-0.27

(4)

OS

Private 1

Public 1

1.004

-0.001

0.003

0.001

0.003

0.009

-0.63

4.45

1.46

2.95

11.8

-0.073

0.23

-0.038

-0.038

1.29

-0.004

0.01

-0.006

0.003

0.048

0.25

-0.006

0

(5)

IS

-0.98

6.98

2.17

5.13

18.7

0.25

-8.37

-1.43

(6)

OS

Public 2

0.052

-0.17

0.048

-0.014

-0.78

0.32

0.075

0.026

(7)

IS

0.055

-0.19

0.051

-0.092

-0.899

0.32

0.223

0.026

(8)

OS

Private 2

0.08

0.75

0.23

0.54

1.33

(9)

1

di↵erent ability levels.

welfare is calculated using equation 1.8 and the total share of students is calculated by summing the shares of the three

levels, 17, 22, and 27, are comparable to the lower, middle, and top terciles of the ACT score distribution. University

and ability level ↵` . The percent change in the share of students enrolled is separated by ability, ↵` , and the three ability

bj ↵` for university j

-0.06

0.5

0.14

0.34

0.93

(10)

2

Not Attend

All values are percent changes. Tuition and aid are the parameters in the price function, Pj (↵` ) = tj

Avg Ability

-2.03

↵` = 27

%

-4.27

↵` = 22

-6.55

-16.3

↵` = 17

in share of students by ability ( j (↵` )):

Total Share

%

Aid (bj )

Uni. Welfare

%

Tuition (tj )

%

%

%

the average ability of students.

Table 1.9.: The e↵ect of $1,000 decrease in per student subsidies to state 1’s public university on tuition, enrollment, and
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Aid (bj )
2.12

-0.39

0

2.12

-2.14

-0.37

-1.34

-0.19

-0.09

-1.34

-0.75

-0.09

(4)

0.06

-0.18

0.76

-0.02

0.32

2.87

-0.2

1.11

0.15

0.69

3.37

0.05

-0.31

-0.05

-0.34

-0.86

0.06

-0.37

-0.07

-0.24

-1.01

2.12

-0.39

0

(5)

IS

-0.18

0.76

-0.02

0.32

2.87

2.12

-2.14

-0.37

(6)

OS

Public 2

-0.2

1.11

0.15

0.69

3.37

-1.34

-0.19

-0.09

(7)

IS

0.05

-0.31

-0.05

-0.34

-0.86

-1.34

-0.75

-0.09

(8)

OS

Private 2

0.008

-0.03

0.01

0.009

-0.09

(9)

1

0.008

-0.03

0.01

0.009

-0.09

(10)

2

Not Attend

bj ↵` for university j and ability level

using equation 1.8 and the total share of students is calculated by summing the shares of the three di↵erent ability levels.

27, are comparable to the lower, middle, and top terciles of the ACT score distribution. University welfare is calculated

↵` . The percent change in the share of students enrolled is separated by ability, ↵` , and the three ability levels, 17, 22, and

by 5 percent. Tuition and aid are the parameters in the price function, Pj (↵` ) = tj

All values are percent changes. A 5 percent increase in demand is calculated by decreasing the surplus of the outside option

Avg Ability

%

-0.07

↵` = 27

-0.37

-0.24

↵` = 22

Total Share

-1.01

↵` = 17

in share of students by ability ( j (↵` )):

Uni. Welfare

%

Tuition (tj )

%

%

%

%

(2)

(1)

(3)

IS

OS

IS

OS

Private 1

Public 1

Table 1.10.: The e↵ect of a 5 percent increase in demand on tuition, enrollment, and the average ability of students.
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Fig. 1.1.: Comparison of in-state public university in Big Ten states
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Fig. 1.2.: Marginal e↵ects of the ACT score on aid as the ACT varies
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Fig. 1.3.: Marginal e↵ects of the ACT score on aid as income varies
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State 1

State 2

Private (r1 )

Private (r2 )

Public (q1 )

Public (q2 )

Fig. 1.4.: Illustration of the three student preference types across the two states.
Solid ellipses are groups of state 1 students. Dashed ellipses are groups of state 2
students. Private means the private university and public means the public university
in each respective state. Private is also denoted by r and public is denoted by q. All
students also have an outside option, which is not shown above, as well as the two
universities in each choice set that are shown above.
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2. UNBUNDLING FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION:
RELAXING THE 90/10 REVENUE CONSTRAINT
2.1

Introduction
For-profit postsecondary institutions have become a large player in higher edu-

cation in the past decade. Deming et al. (2012) and Gilpin et al. (2015) document
and explains the large growth in the for-profit sector. Along with the growth in the
for-profit sector, there has also been growth in scrutiny and regulation of the forprofit sector. One regulation, the 90/10 rule, has applied to for-profit postsecondary
institutions in some form since 1992. Under the 90/10 rule, a for-profit school cannot
receive more than 90 percent of their revenue from Title IV funds. Title IV funds are
federal aid dollars disbursed by the Department of Education based on a student’s
financial need.
For-profit institutions are able to bundle separate campuses together as one entity
in order to comply with the 90/10 rule. In 2008, congress passed a reauthorization
of the Higher Education Act that relaxes the 90/10 violation policy on for-profit
institutions. The policy change allows schools to violate the rule two years in row
instead of one year before losing eligibility for Federal Title IV aid. Executives at
for-profit corporations actively considered bundling campuses when deciding on 90/10
rule compliance strategies. According to a 2012 Senate report, an executive at Herzing
University1 wrote in an email in 2009:
My initial thought is to match Toledo with Omaha because they are
smaller enterprises and that way we can reserve Minneapolis for Akron if
necessary. Right now the Toledo/Omaha rate would be . . . 72.6% . . .
1

Herzing University converted to non-profit status in 2015, likely to avoid new and proposed ”gainful
employment“ regulations on for-profit universities.
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Right now Akron/Minneapolis would be . . . 78.5%. This group could in
theory go up to the $20,000,000.00 mark in combined revenue, with the
current cash and still be under the 90% threshold.
The Herzing executive cares both about the combined rate of the campuses, as well
as the amount of revenue the campuses receive individually and combined.
I examine the impact of relaxing the 90/10 rule violation policy on the behavior
of for-profit institutions and estimate the impact of the rule change on the amount of
federal student aid received by for-profit institutions. Using individual student level
data from the Department of Education, I find for-profit students have increased
their reliance on Title IV aid after the rule change. The increase in Title IV aid usage
cannot be explained by demographic changes or a decrease in reliance on non Title
IV aid. I develop a theoretical model in which universities consider both the size of
the universities and the Title IV revenue percentages when making campus bundling
decisions. I show that relaxing the violation policy increases the size of campus
bundles and revenue in for-profit institutions, which is supported by the data. I also
estimate that relaxing the 90/10 rule violation policy causes an extra 900 million
dollars in Federal aid to go to for-profit institutions.
The for-profit education sector is increasingly important to understand as they
become a larger player in postsecondary education. For-profit postsecondary growth
is driven by a number of factors. In one of the earlier papers studying for-profit
institution growth, Cellini (2009) finds that two year for-profit institutions are a
substitute for non-profit community colleges. She found that local communities in
California voting to fund a public community college decreased the number of forprofit institutions in the market, as well as private college enrollment, while increasing
public college enrollment. In her 2010 paper, Cellini finds that increases in the Pell
and Cal grant programs increase2 the number of public and for-profit institutions,
though the increase in for-profit institutions is larger. Gilpin et al. (2015) find that
2

It is worth noting that Kane (1995) shows that means tested aid, like Pell grants, may not increase
enrollments
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occupation growth in the fields for-profit institutions o↵er explains some of the growth
in for-profit sector. No matter the causes of the for-profit sector growth, a larger
number of for-profit institutions means more Title IV aid is directed to the for-profit
sector, and any Title IV eligibility change will have a larger impact.
Understanding the regulations on the higher education industry is crucial to understanding how these regulations a↵ect the for-profit sector. These regulations include
the di↵erent types of Title IV aid and the eligibility requirements to receive this aid.
Eligibility requirements di↵er between for-profit institutions and non-profit schools.
The 90/10 rule is an eligibility requirement only applied to for-profit institutions. It is
meant to ensure that at least some students value the education at the for-profit institution enough to be willing to pay for it out of pocket. Also, universities are allowed
to bundle together campuses when submitting compliance reports to the Department
of Education. Non-profit universities do not have any incentive to bundle campuses
together. Because of the 90/10 rule, for-profit institutions have a strong incentive
to bundle campuses together when submitting compliance reports. In section 2.1.1,
I discuss the regulations on the higher education industry in more detail along with
the policy changes passed by congress in 2008.

2.1.1

Regulations on the Higher Education Industry

Title IV Aid
The Higher Education Act of 1965, under Title IV, created a number of student
aid programs administered by the Department of Education. There are three di↵erent
kinds of Title IV aid, grants, loans, and work study. Students are not required to
repay grants, but they are required to repay loans, with interest.
Title IV grants include Pell grants, Federal Supplemental Education Opportunity
grants (FSEOG), Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education
(TEACH) grants, and the Iraq/Afghan Service grant3 . Pell grants are the most
3

This grant was created in the 2010-2011 academic year
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common and are need based. The amount depends on whether the student attends
part time or full time, and if they are taking classes for the full year or less. FSEOGs
are similar to Pell grants in that they are also need based. They are di↵erent in
that instead of being disbursed directly to the student, each school receives a certain
amount of FSEOG money and students must apply to the school instead of the
Department of Education, and may not receive the aid if the FSEOG funds have
already been allocated. Title IV aid distributed by the college is called campus based
aid. TEACH grants go to students in eligible education programs. TEACH grants are
not need based, have service requirements, and are based on the subject the student
is preparing to teach. If the service requirements are not met, the TEACH grant is
converted to a Direct Unsubsidized loan.
Title IV loans included Direct Subsidized and Unsubsidized loans, Sta↵ord Subsidized and Unsubsidized loans, Direct PLUS loans to parents or graduate students,
and Federal Perkins loans. Direct loans are made directly from the Department of Education. Sta↵ord loans are funded by private banks and the transaction is facilitated
by the Department of Education. Subsidized loans are need based. The government
pays the interest during for nonpayment periods4 . Unsubsidized loans are available to
everyone, regardless of need. The Perkins loan is for students with exceptional need.
The interest rate is set at 5 percent and the student borrows directly from the school.
Perkins loans are another form of campus based aid, and not all schools participate
in this program.
Title IV work study programs are also campus based aid, and are funded the
same way as FSEOGs and Perkins loans. Funds are to be used to help pay for the
students education, though the school must pay the student directly unless otherwise
requested by the student.
Student need is determined when they fill out the Free Application for Federal
Student Aid (FAFSA). A complex, nonlinear formula is used to determine the Expected Family Contribution (EFC). The formula is based on the student’s income and
4

After leaving school, loan repayment is deferred for six months
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wealth, the parent’s income and wealth, how many siblings the student has attending a postsecondary institution, and the cost of attendance at their chosen schools,
among other things. Need based Title IV aid is e↵ected by the student’s EFC. The
higher the EFC is, the less need based aid is available.
Schools must be eligible to receive Title IV aid. A for-profit institution is eligible
if it provides a program that prepares students for gainful employment, is accredited
by a recognized regional or nationally recognized accrediting agency, and has been in
existence for at least two years. A for-profit institution is also subject to the 90/10
constraint. For-profit institutions can choose whether or not to apply for Title IV
eligibility. Cellini and Goldin (2012) estimates that tuition at Title IV eligible forprofit institutions is about 75 percent higher than tuition at comparable non Title
IV eligible institutions. Cellini and Goldin note that while the tuition gap between
Title IV and non Title IV for-profit institutions could be caused by those institutions
increasing tuition to get more aid, the tuition may be higher to compensate for the
cost of obtaining and maintaining Title IV eligibility.
Turner (2014b) estimates the economic incidence of a specific Title IV program,
namely Pell grants. She finds that students receiving more Pell grant aid receive less
institutional aid. Non-profit universities decrease institutional aid by approximately
78 cents for every Pell grant dollar received by a student. For-profit institutions, on
the other, decrease aid only by about 6 cents for every Pell grant dollar, though this
may be because for-profit institutions do not o↵er much institutional aid in the first
place and use the tuition to capture Pell grant dollars. Cellini and Goldin (2012)
suggests that tuition rather than institutional aid may be more sensitive to increases
in Title IV aid.

The 90/10 Rule
In 1992, the 85/15 rule was implemented in the Higher Education Amendments to
restrict the amount of federal funds for-profit postsecondary institutions could receive.
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The rule applied only to for-profit institutions, and restricts them from earning more
than 85 percent of their revenue from federal Title IV student aid. The rule is similar
to a rule implemented by the Department of Veterans A↵airs, which states that not
more than 85 percent of a program’s students may receive benefits from the VA. The
VA’s rule was also implemented in 1992, though the 1952 Korean Conflict GI Bill
includes similar language. While these two rules are similar, the 85/15 rule in the
Higher Education Amendment of 1992 applies to revenue while the other applies to
the number of students in a program. The 85/15 rule was implemented to ensure
federal dollars were going to a quality program. Legislators thought that if at least
fifteen percent of students were willing to pay out of pocket5 , then the program is
valued enough to support with federal aid.
The Higher Education Amendment of 1998 was more lenient to for-profit institutions, changing the 85/15 rule to the 90/10 rule. The 90/10 rule still applies only to
for-profit institutions and restricts them from receiving more than 90 percent of their
revenue from Title IV federal student aid. If the school violates the 90/10 rule for one
year, becomes provisionally certified. If the school is caught violating the 90/10 rule
for two years in a row, the school loses Title IV eligibility. To regain eligibility, the
school has to meet licensing, accreditation, and financial responsibility requirements
for two years.
Calculating the 90/10 revenue percentage is rather complex. In general, aid disbursed by the Department of Education is considered Title IV aid, though there are
exceptions. The Department of Education disburses both subsidized and unsubsidized loans, but only subsidized loans and some portion of unsubsidized loans count
as Title IV aid. Also, federal aid to veterans and active military are not Title IV aid,
and do not count towards Title IV revenue. For-profit institutions have an incentive
to recruit students eligible for veteran and military benefits to reduce their reliance
on Title IV aid.
5

Or each student is willing to pay fifteen percent of the tuition out of pocket.
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The 2012 Senate report discusses that for-profit institutions use many strategies
to comply with the 90/10 rule. As one Herzing University executive wrote, ”90/10
is a multi-front battle, like cancer - we won’t find one single solution other than abolition.“ For-profit institutions can change the way their campuses are bundled, stop
disbursing Title IV funds to a bundle of campuses, require students to pay up front in
cash, increase tuition, make it difficult for students to receive living expense stipends,
pursue military benefits, and convert to non-profit status if the situation becomes
dire6 . I focus on how the rule changes in the 2008 Higher Education Opportunity Act
a↵ects the campus bundling behavior at for-profit institutions.

For-profit “Bundling”
Bundling describes how a for-profit institution with many campuses combines different subsets of those institutions with each subset submitting their own financial
statements that determine their 90/10 revenue percentage. The Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE) within the Department of Education issues a single numeric
ID for each entity that receives Title IV funds, called an OPEID. At non-profit institutions, each separate campus is associated with a specific OPEID, so the OPEID
is tied to a unique geographic location. At for-profit institutions, separate campuses
from across the country can be associated with one OPEID. Institutions can also
change which campuses are associated with an OPEID. According to a Senate Congressional report in 2012, changing the campuses covered by an OPEID requires the
Department of Education, the college’s accrediting agency, and State regulators to
approve the change.
In my data, for example, ITT Tech had 43 di↵erent campuses across the US in
2008. These 43 di↵erent campuses were split into 22 di↵erent bundles. Each of these
bundles is associated with just one 90/10 revenue percentage. These bundles are
6

There was also a period from 2008 to 2012 during which 50 percent of the value of institutional
loans counted as non Title IV revenue that were made during that fiscal year, instead of only the
cash repayments made during that fiscal year counted as non Title IV revenue.
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determined by the company that owns the ITT Tech, and are apparently unrelated
to the proximity of the campuses. For example, one bundle includes campuses located in Washington, Kansas, and North Carolina. Another includes campuses in
California, Missouri, and Georgia. In the quote at the beginning of the paper, Herzing University was considering pairings that included Toledo with Omaha and Akron
with Minneapolis, even though pairing Toledo with Akron would make more sense if
geography mattered.
Bundling campuses across states occurs relatively frequently in my data, and the
universities most frequently engaging in this type of bundling tend to be well known,
publicly traded names such as ITT Tech, Everest College, and Brown Mackie College.
Other for-profit institutions like the University of Phoenix, Bryant and Stratton College, and National American University bundle all their campuses together instead
of dividing them into subsets. Since the 90/10 revenue percentage associated with
a particular bundle of campuses cannot be tied to a specific geographic region, it is
impossible to account for local economic and demographic conditions and changes
without first unbundling the revenue percentages. I provide a process that unbundles
for-profit institution’s revenue percentages.

The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008
President Bush signed the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA)
on August 14th. It reauthorized the Higher Education Act of 1965, which must be
renewed every four to six years. The HEOA expired in 2013, though the changes it
made remain in place until congress passes a reauthorization bill. As section 2.1.1
mentioned, the government began imposing accountability measures on for-profit institutions in 1992. The HEOA changed some of those accountability measures, as
well as adding new ones.
I focus on the change in the enforcement of the 90/10 rule, which a↵ects for-profit
institutions’ eligibility for Title IV aid. The HEOA moved the 90/10 rule language
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into the program participation agreement, instead of leaving it in the eligibility requirements. As an eligibility requirement, violating the 90/10 rule results in a loss
of eligibility in the university’s next fiscal year. Moving the rule into the program
participation agreement gives for-profit institution a second year to come back into
compliance with the 90/10 rule. Moving the language was e↵ective on the date of signing in 2008, but the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) was not updated until July
1st, 2010. I consider the rule change e↵ective in 2010, though for-profit institutions
undoubtedly anticipated the change.
The HEOA also contains changes to the calculation of the 90/10 revenue percentage. Before 2008, loan repayments counted as non Title IV revenue, but not the net
present value of the loans. Between 2008 and 2012, the net present value of loans
made by the for-profit institutions count as non Title IV revenue. Since the change
in 90/10 percentage calculation occurs during most of the years in my data, I need
to consider its e↵ect on for-profit institutions’ behavior. The calculation change increases the amount of non Title IV revenue a for-profit institutions receives, which
decreases the revenue percentage if the institution doesn’t change its behavior. The
institution can accept more Title IV aid, but without a change in the 90/10 violation
policy the institution has no incentive to exceed their revenue percentage before the
calculation change by increasing their Title IV revenue. Since the calculation change
starts at the beginning of my data and expires near the end, it does not complicate
my analysis of the violation rule change that occurs in the middle of my data.
Recently, the Department of Education has been working on requiring for-profit
institutions to prove their students are gainfully employed to maintain Title IV eligibility. These regulations are called gainful employment requirements. While the
term gainful employment has existed in the Higher Education Act since 1965, schools
haven’t been required to provide proof that their alumni are gainfully employed. The
Department of Education has been working of defining gainful employment using
metrics like debt-to-income ratios, loan repayment rates, and completion and job
placement rates.
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While the Department of Education’s metrics are untested when it comes to predicting success in for-profit students, Cellini and Chaudhry (2013), Lang and Weinstein (2013), and Deming et al. (2014) all estimate the gains to attending a for-profit
institution. Cellini and Chaudhry (2013) estimate that for-profit students earn about
10 percent more relative to high school graduates without a college degree, which
translates to about a 4 percent return per year of education in a for-profit institution.
Compared to estimates of returns in other sectors, 4 percent is slightly lower. Lang
and Weinstein (2013) finds no statistically significant di↵erence between the return
to certificates and associates degrees from for-profit institutions or non-profit institutions. Lang and Weinstein’s point estimates suggest that for-profit certificates have
a lower return and for-profit associates degrees have a higher return. On the other
hand, Deming et al. (2014) investigates how employers view degrees from for-profit
institutions. Their results vary by the type of job, but they generally found that
candidates with a for-profit degree were never more likely to be called back. Estimating the costs and benefits of attending di↵erent types of postsecondary institutions
to students and taxpayers, Cellini finds that for-profit students needs an earnings
increase of 8.5 percent per year to cover the cost, while a community college student
requires a gain of 5.3 percent per year.
The gainful employment rule was originally introduced in 2011, but a federal judge
put a hold on it. For-profit higher education industry groups and the Department of
Education are currently fighting over gainful employment requirements in court. Since
gainful employment requirements have not been enforced throughout my sample, I
do not consider their e↵ect on for-profit institutions’ behavior.

2.2

Students at For-Profit Institutions
Students attending for-profit institutions di↵er from those attending non-profit

institutions. Deming et al. (2012) find that for-profit institutions attract more female
and minority students on average, using the Beginning Postsecondary Student Longi-
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tudinal Study from 2004 to 2009 (BPS 2004/2009). The BPS 2004/2009 is restricted
student level data that is not able to observe changes in student composition over time.
Since demographic changes at for-profit institutions may a↵ect their bundling behavior, I use the 2008 and 2012 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS7 ) to
calculate and compare changes in student’s federal aid and demographics at for-profit
and non-profit institutions. Since the HEOA changes I study took place in 2010, the
2008 and 2012 NPSAS provide a before and after picture of students in for-profit and
non-profit institutions.
Table 2.4 provides demographic summary statistics of for-profit and non-profit
students in 2008 and 2012. As Deming et al. (2012) found, women and minorities
attend for-profit institutions at higher rates than non-profit institutions. Between
2008 and 2012, the share of both women and minorities attending for-profit institutions has decreased even though both still comprise a majority of the for-profit
student body. Non-profit institutions also have a majority share of women that has
decreased between 2008 and 2012, though their share of minorities has increased.
While most students at all institutions are not married and the percentage of unmarried students is increasing over time, there are more married students at for-profit
institutions than at non-profit institutions. For-profit students are older on average
than non-profit students, though students in both sector have gotten younger between
2008 and 2012.
Most important for federal aid receipt, and thus for bundling decisions, are income
and tax dependency status. A much higher percentage of non-profit students are
dependents than for-profit students, though the dependency rate has increased over
time in both sectors. Family income is higher for both dependent and independent
non-profit students, though average income has fallen between 2008 and 2012. Lower
income allows students to qualify for more Title IV aid. If for-profit students are
qualifying for more Title IV aid, the 90/10 constraint is more likely to bind at each
campus.
7

The 2004 NPSAS is the base study from which the participants in the BPS 2004/2009 are drawn.
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Table 2.5 displays the percentage of students with di↵erent types of aid, as well
as the amount of aid they received conditional on the student receiving a positive
amount of that aid. The percentage of students in both sectors receiving Pell grants
has grown significantly from 2008 to 2012, though a much higher percentage of forprofit students receive Pell grants than non-profit students. Over three quarters of
for-profit students also take out Federal loans to pay for their education, compared
to about forty percent of non-profit students. The percentage of for-profit students
receiving Federal loans has increased from 2008 to 2012, too, while there has been no
growth in the percentage of non-profit students Federal loan usage.
Table 2.6 shows that, conditional on receiving a nonzero aid amount, for-profit
students are relying more on Title IV aid in 2012 and less on non-Title IV aid than in
2008 while non-profit student Title IV usage remains stagnant. For-profit institutions
also saw a growth in the percentage of students receiving aid from the Department
of Veterans A↵airs, and the amount those veteran students receive at for-profit institutions nearly doubled, as well. Veteran student growth at non-profit institutions is
stagnant between 2008 and 2012, and the amount non-profit veteran students receive
grew by much less than at for-profit institutions. When the 90/10 constraint was
relaxed from the one year violation rule to the two year violation rule, for-profit institutions became able to rely more on Title IV aid and used techniques, like rearranging
campus bundles or recruiting veterans, to allow their students to receive more Title
IV aid.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 do not condition on student demographic, aid, or institution
characteristics. While for-profit students rely more of Title IV aid in 2012, they also
have lower incomes in 2012. If the increase in for-profit students reliance on Title
IV aid is driven solely by demographics, then it’s possible for-profit institutions are
responding to demographic changes only and not the changes in the 90/10 constraint
violation rules. I estimate the equation
Aidij =

0

+

1 I[year

= 2012] +

1i Di

+

2i Ai

+

j Sj

+ #ij

(2.1)
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where Aidij is the amount or percentage of the student’s aid, I[year = 2012] is one if
the year is 2012 and zero in 2008, Di is a vector of student demographic characteristics including immigration status, income, dependency status, race, a quadratic in
age, sex, marital status, and ACT score, Ai is a vector of student aid characteristics
including all non-Title IV Federal aid, all state and local grants, and all state, local,
and private loans, and Sj is a vector of institution level characteristics including tuition and campus fixed e↵ects. Campus fixed e↵ects are included to capture location
specific changes that are not captured by student characteristics. I estimate equation
2.1 using only students at for-profit institutions, and I use the estimated equation
2.1 to calculate the average amount of Aid students receive in 2008 and 2012. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 contains average aid amounts conditional on student and institution
characteristics calculated from equation 2.1.
After controlling for demographic, aid, and institutional variables, the nearly
$2,000 increase from 2008 to 2012 in Title IV aid reliance decreases to a little over a
$1,000 increase. Demographic, non Title IV aid usage, and campus specific policies
explain a little less than half of the increase in Title IV aid usage. The Title IV
aid usage increase is due to an increase in the use of Pell Grants, as opposed to an
increase in subsidized loans. The Pell Grant maximum award increased from $4,310
in 2008 to $5,550 in 20128 . The increase in the maximum award caused students to
receive a large Pell grant award, thus driving up the amount of Title IV aid each
student received. Not all students receive the maximum Pell Grant award. Between
2008 and 2012, the students received on average about 7 percentage points more of
the maximum Pell Grant Award in 2012 as well as receiving a larger total dollar Pell
Grant award in 2012. The increase in Pell Grants is caused both by an increase in
the maximum award amount as well as an increase in the percentage of the maximum
Pell Grant awarded.
While for-profit students are relying more on Pell Grants, they are relying less
on subsidized loans. Without controlling for demographic, aid, or institution char8

$5,550 in 2012 is $5,304.54 in 2008 dollars

67
acteristics, students use of subsidized loans did not change between 2008 and 2012.
After controlling for those characteristics, usage of subsidized loans fell by about $240
from 2008 to 2012. Reliance on unsubsidized loans has increased, though, by about
$900 whether conditioning on student and institution characteristics or not. Moving
away from subsidized loans and toward Pell grants reduces for-profit student debt
for low income students, though that decrease in reliance on debt disappears when
unsubsidized loans are considered.
Since the increase in Title IV aid is not explained by demographic, aid, or campus
location characteristics, the change in for-profit campus bundling behavior around
2010 is at least partially explained by the HEOA.

2.3

Theory
For-profit postsecondary education just recently came to the attention of economists.

Until now, no one has modeled the bundling behavior of for-profit institutions. My
model consists of for-profit institutions that have the option of opening some number
of campuses. Each campus has some Title IV revenue and some non Title IV revenue.
Since I focus on the bundling behavior of for-profit institutions, I abstract away from
90/10 compliance strategies that rely on changing the 90/10 ratio within an individual campus by assuming that the non Title IV revenue is drawn from a known
distribution and is not a random variable. Title IV revenue has a known component
but also has a random component, so each institution does not know exactly how
much Title IV revenue each campus earns.
In deciding how to bundle their campuses, for-profit institutions care about about
the amount of Title IV and non Title IV revenue each campus receives and the resulting 90/10 percentage of the possible pairings. For-profit universities can also choose
to open or close some campuses. In a 2010 email about acquiring new campuses, a
Herzing University executive wrote, ”We are only interested in schools with low 90/10
ratios, which are healthy, and $1M+ in revenue.“ In my model, for-profit institutions
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have the option of opening a set number of campuses, though they do not have to
open all of the possible campuses. The option of not opening all campuses simulates
for-profit institutions’ option of opening or closing campuses after the 90/10 violation
rule changes.
The model consists of two periods, so I can compare a two year violation rule to a
one year violation rule. I assume the bundles of campuses are chosen before the first
period, and the bundle composition is permanent. In reality, universities can change
their bundle composition with the approval of the Department of Education, the
college’s accrediting agency, and state regulators. While these three entities normally
approve of the changes, the process is costly and takes time. I construct the model
to compare a one year violation regime to a two year violation regime, so I abstract
away from any dynamic choices for-profit universities might encounter, which includes
changing bundle composition between periods.

2.3.1

The Model

Assume there is one for-profit institution with n campuses. All campuses are
the same size and generate the same revenue. They only di↵er in the percentage of
revenue derived from Title IV aid. There are two time periods, t = {1, 2}. Before
the start of these two periods, the institution chooses its set of bundles. During these
periods, the institution cannot change the configuration of the bundle set.
Each campus, i, has an associated average Title IV revenue percentage, ⇢i,t . The
revenue percentage, ⇢i,t , is determined by three components: Title IV revenue, which
has a fixed and a random component, and non-Title IV revenue.
Title IV revenue has a known, time invariant, component, µi , and an unknown,
time varying, random component, ✏i,t , so that T IVi,t = µi + ✏i,t , where T IVi,t is Title
IV revenue at campus i in time t. The unknown component follows a mean zero
bivariate normal distribution with covariance matrix ⌃. Non-Title IV revenue is a
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known, campus specific, time invariant constant, ⌘i . The revenue percentage takes
the form:
⇢i,t =

µi + ✏i,t
⌘i + µi + ✏i,t

(2.2)

Note that the revenue percentage can be rearranged so that:
⇢i
1

⇢i

=

µi + ✏i,t
⌘i

(2.3)

The revenue percentage must be below a certain percentage, , otherwise the
campus violates the

rule and must shut down. Two possible versions of the rule

exist. Under the one year rule, the institution must keep every campus below the
revenue percentage each period. Under the two year rule, the institution must keep
every campus below the

revenue percentage for at least one period.

Under the one year rule, the institution is interested in the probability that a
particular campus does not violate the rule in both periods:
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is the bivariate normal probability density function for campus i. Under

the two year rule, the institution is interested in the probability that a particular
campus does not violate the
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rule in at least one of the periods:
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Figure 2.1 shows the di↵erent regions the integrals in equations 2.4 and 2.5 cover.
Since these regions do not depend on the distribution, the random Title IV time
shocks do not need to be independent and I can allow for correlation over time,
though I do not to simplify the simulation. The one year rule covers only region A in
figure 2.1. The two year rule expands the coverage to region A + B + D. Since the
area under the

i (✏i,1 , ✏i,2 )

expands, campusese have a higher probability of satisfying

the revenue constraint under the two year rule than the one year rule.
Suppose the institution combines the campuses into bundles with N being the set
of all bundles and |N |  n. There are a number of ways to aggregate campuses. I
sum the Title IV and non-Title IV revenues separately to account for size di↵erences
across campuses. Consider a bundle J ✓ N that has |J| > 1. Using equation 2.3,
note that:
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An institution decreases their probability of violating the revenue percentage rule by
bundling their campuses together.
Assuming that ✏j are independent 8j simplifies calculating the variance of a bundle’s revenue percentage. It is also a reasonable assumption to make. Bundles can,
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and do, include campuses from many di↵erent states. While shocks to the national
economy may a↵ect revenue percentages of all campuses, regional shocks may di↵er
because the universities are located hundreds or thousands of miles apart. If regional
shocks are relatively uncorrelated, my model doesn’t lose anything by assuming independence across shocks to di↵erent campuses.
Every campus in the institution earns a revenue of µi + ✏i + ⌘i and incurs a cost of
ci while it is operating. The realized profit for each campus is ⇡i = µi + ✏i + ⌘i

ci . If

an institution violates the rule, the institution does not earn any profit. The expected
profit of a single campus is ⇧i =
a bundle, J, is ⇧J =

J(1
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campus in the bundle. The expected profit for the institution is the sum of the
expected profits of each bundle, or
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Here, I use C|J| to denote the administrative cost to operating |J| number of bundles.
The institution’s problem is:
max
N

Each university must:

|N |
X

⇧J

(2.6)

J=1

1. Choose how many campuses to open
2. Choose the set of bundles, conditioning on which campuses it decides to open
when maximizing profits.
If the institution bundles all their campuses together, their probability of violating
the revenue percentage is minimized. But if they do violate the revenue percentage,
the entire institution is shut down and they lose their entire profit. On the other
hand, if they do not bundle, each campus has higher chance of violating the rule but
only that campus loses its profit if it violates the rule.
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2.3.2

Simulation

There is no clear analytical solution to equation 2.6. I report the distribution
of choices from simulated universities. To fix ideas on how the simulation works,
consider a university that has the option of opening two campuses. The possible sets
of campuses the university can open are:
1 :{?}
3 : {2}

2 :{1}
4 :{1}, {2}

5 : {1, 2}

Even though the university can open two campuses, it may choose not to if the
expected profit for that combination is less than zero. If the university does choose
to open two campuses, it then needs to choose whether it should open the campuses
as two separate bundles or to bundle the two campuses together. Depending on the
expected average Title IV revenue percentage is for each campus, di↵erent universities
will choose di↵erent sets of bundles even if they are opening the same number of
campuses.
To illustrate the e↵ect of the rule change,I simulate 100,000 universities. While
there are not 100,000 for-profit universities, simulating many universities approximates the true distribution of university entry and bundling decisions for the chosen
parameters. Each university has the option of opening four campuses, which means
there are 52 possible sets of bundles, including the empty set (non-entry in the market). The campus parameters are:
= {0.85, 0.9}
µi ⇠ N (120, 000, 30, 0002 )
⌘i ⇠ N (16, 000, 4, 0002 )
2
i

= 100, 000

c i = µi + ⌘i + ⇣ i
⇣i ⇠ N ( 1, 000, 1, 0002 )
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These parameters are chosen to illustrate the e↵ect of the rule change and are not
calibrated to the data. Under these parameters, the average Title IV revenue percentage using these values is about 88.2. Figure 2.2 shows the simulated distribution
of expected Title IV revenue percentages for one campus at each university. The true
distribution in figure 2.2 is not known. The average revenue percentage in figure 2.2 is
higher than the average revenue percentage in the data because the revenue percentages in the data are observed after for-profit institutions have worked to comply with
the revenue constraint. I assume the true campus revenue percentage distribution is
higher than observed, since otherwise there would be no need to bundle to comply
with the revenue constraint. The simulation illustrates one possible mechanism to
explain the observed change in for-profit institution’s bundling behavior.
The cost parameter, ci , determines entry into the market. If the cost is set sufficiently low by giving ⇣i a low mean, every university will choose to open all four
campuses. The administrative cost, C|J| , is a multiplicative combination of the costs of
each campus in the bundle. For example, if there are three campuses with costs c1 , c2 ,
and c3 and each campus is its own bundle, then C|J| = c1·c2+c1·c3+c2·c3+c1·c2·c3.
If campuses 1 and 2 are bundled together and campus 3 is its own bundle, then
C|J| = (c1 + c2) · c3. If all three campuses are bundled together, then C|J| = 0 since I
assume there is no extra administrative cost to running only one bundle.
Violating the revenue constraint at a campus causes the university to lose the
campus, and the profit associated with that campus. Suppose a university has two
campuses, campus 1 and campus 2. Suppose campus 1 has a revenue percentage
of 92 percent the first year and 88 percent the second year, and campus 2 has a
revenue percentage of 88 both years. Under both the one year rule and the two year
rule, campus 2 is below the 90 percent constraint and the university earns all profits
associated with campus 2. On the other hand, campus 1 violates the constraint in
the first year. Under the one year rule, campus 1 shuts down and the university only
profits from campus 2. On the other hand, campus 1 does not violate the constraint

74
in the second year. Under the two year rule, the university profits from campus 1
and campus 2.

2.3.3

Results

In table 2.1, I report the results of the simulation in four di↵erent regulatory
environments and compare them to the analog in the data. The first environment is
a one year violation rule versus a two year violation rule. The second environment
is a 90 percent upper limit for Title IV revenue versus an 85 percent upper limit for
Title IV revenue. Columns one and two show the results under the 85/15 rule for the
one and two year violation rules. Columns three and four show the results under the
90/10 rule for the one and two year violation rules. I use the same set of simulated
campuses for all regulatory environments. Columns five and six show the analog in
the data to the 90/10 regulatory environment in columns three and four. In columns
five and six, I calculate bundle size and revenue percentages using the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System and revenue percentage estimates described
in section 2.4. The pre 2010 data corresponds to the one year violation rule while the
post 2010 data corresponds to a two year violation rule.
I report the average size of a bundle, the average revenue percentage, and the
average university profit in table 2.1. Under both the 90/10 constraint and the 85/15
constraint, the average bundle size increases under the two year violation rule due
to a lower probability of violating the rule and a lower administrative cost. The
observed average bundle size increases after 2010, which mirrors the simulation. The
simulation also shows that the average revenue percentage is higher under the two
year violation rule regardless of whether universities are constrained by the 85/15 rule
or the 90/10 rule. The estimated average campus revenue percentage increases after
2010, which mirrors the simulation. When I exclude bundles consisting of only one
campus, the simulation produces numbers similar to the data. Though the simulation
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is an example and not a calibration, it more closely matches the data when single
campus institutions are excluded.
Comparing the bundle size and average revenue percentages between the 90/10
simulation and the 85/15 simulation, universities under the 85/15 rule are more cautious. They do not open as many high revenue percentage campuses as they would
under the 90/10 constraint, which decreases the size of the average bundle.
I also calculate average university profit in table 2.1, but only for the simulations.
I do not have data on, and cannot calculate, profit at for-profit institutions. In the
simulations, I find that universities are more profitable under the 90/10 constraint
than the 85/15 constraint. I also find that, under both constraints, universities are
more profitable under the two year violation rule than the one year violation rule.
Since the HEOA occurs while the 90/10 rule is in e↵ect, I focus on the results
under the 90/10 rule. For the 90/10 rule, expected profits and bundle sizes are both
higher under the two year violation rule. My model and simulation suggest that after
switching to the two year rule, I should observe larger bundle sizes and each institution
should have fewer bundles. The model takes the amount of revenue each campus
earns as exogenous. If this is not the case, for-profit universities may manipulate
their admissions or advertising to change their average revenue percentage. Since the
probability of violating the rule is smaller under the two year rule, universities have
an incentive to increase the µi or

2
i

of their campuses which are both exogenous in

my model.

2.4

Methodology and Data
To test the predictions implied by my theory, I need data on revenue percentages

for every for-profit campus before and after the rule change in 2010. Since campus
specific data on Title IV revenue applied only to tuition and education related expenses does not exist, unbundling requires constructing an alternative measure of
the 90/10 revenue percentage. I use the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
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System (IPEDS) to create both campus specific and bundle specific proxy revenue
percentages, along with the actual revenue percentage data downloaded from studentaid.ed.gov.
The IPEDS includes all postsecondary schools accept Title IV aid and is reported
for each separate campus within an institution. Cellini and Goldin (2012) estimate
that the number of for-profit institutions is twice as large as the official count and
number of students is one-quarter to one-third larger. These schools are not included
in my data, and would make a poor control group since they are not required to
submit compliance reports to the Department of Education. Gilpin et al. (2015) note
that the current for-profit higher education literature focuses on two year schools
that mainly grant associates degrees. Since the 90/10 rule applies to all for-profit
institutions, I include four year, two year, and less than two year schools in my
analysis. Some for-profit institutions include di↵erent types of schools in the same
bundle, so excluding any type of for-profit institution could bias my results. Though
I observe each campus’ revenues, expenditures, and enrollments, I do not observe to
which institution each campus belongs. Ownership of for-profit campuses matters
because my theory predicts a for-profit institution will open fewer campuses and
increase the size of the bundle. Since I do not observe ownership, I can only test
whether bundle size increases.
The reported revenue percentage is taken from the EZ-Audit system through
which universities report their financial data to the Office of Postsecondary Education
to ensure regulatory compliance. The Institute for Education Sciences (IES), which
is the institute that collects the IPEDS, is an entirely separate from the Office of
Postsecondary Education (OPE) within the Department of Education, though they
collect similar data. The OPE has released the 90/10 revenue percentages on the
studentaid.ed.gov site from the 2007-2008 academic year to the 2012 to 2013 academic
year. The OPE only reports revenue percentages for each bundle, not each campus
within the bundle. So to estimate a revenue percentage for each campus, I merge the
IPEDS data with the revenue percentage data.
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2.4.1

Unbundling the 90/10 Revenue Percentage

Ideally, I would take the total amount of Title IV aid each for-profit campus
receives and divide it by its tuition and fee revenue. The IPEDS does not include
the each campuses total Title IV revenue, but it does contains components of Title
IV revenue such as total Pell grants. I use Pell grant revenue as a proxy because it is
the largest Title IV grant program and is positively correlated with the total amount
of Title IV funds an institution receives. The IPEDS does not contain data on total
Title IV aid revenue or even Title IV subsidized government loans.
In the IPEDS, there are unique identifiers for both campuses and bundles. Using
^ at both the
the campus level data, I construct my revenue percentage proxy, revpct,
campus level and the bundle level. Since Pell grants are only a portion of the Title
^ is generally much lower than the observed
IV revenue a institution receives, revpct
90/10 revenue percentages, and so it is not directly comparable to the actual revenue
percentage. Understanding the e↵ect of unbundling for-profit institutions requires a
measure of an unbundled 90/10 percentage that is directly comparable to the bundled
revenue percentage.
To unbundle the revenue percentage to the campus level, I estimate a revenue
\ t,i for each campus, i, using revpct
^ t,i . To do this, I first estimate
percentage, revpct
the equation:
revpctj = ↵0 +

4
X
l=1

where

1,j

and

2,j

l

^ t,j +
↵l revpct

1,j

+

2,j

· I(year

2010) + 't,j

(2.7)

are bundle fixed e↵ects for before 2010 and after 2010, respectively.

The indicator function I(year

2010) is one when the year is 2010 or later and

zero otherwise. Equation 2.7 is estimated at the bundle level. Here, revpctj is the
^ t,j is the 90/10 percentage
observed revenue percentage for each bundle and revpct
^ b to
proxy calculated for each bundle. I fit equation 2.7 using a quartic in revpct
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capture any possible nonlinearities in the relationship between the proxy and the
\ t,i using the equation:
actual value. I predict revpct
\ t,i = ↵
revpct
ˆ0 +

4
X
l=1

l

^ t,i + ˆ1,j + ˆ2,j · I(year
↵
ˆ l revpct

2010)

(2.8)

Equation 2.8 predicts revenue percentages for each campus allowing the bundle composition to change with the rule change. The predicted campus revenue percentages
are deviations from that campus’s bundles’ average revenue percentage. The direction
^ t,i .
of the deviation is determined by the magnitude of the proxy, revpct
I check equation 2.7’s fit by predicting bundle level revenue percentages using the
equation:
\ t,j = ↵
revpct
ˆ0 +

4
X
l=1

l

^ t,j + ˆ1,j + ˆ2,j · I(year
↵
ˆ l revpct

2010)

(2.9)

Note that equation 2.8 is calculated using the campus level proxy while equation
2.9 is calculated using the bundle level proxy. The distributions the actual revenue
percentages and the two predicted revenue percentages from equations 2.8 and 2.9
are shown in figure 2.5 along with the distribution of true revenue percentages. The
predicted revenue percentages for the bundles follows the actual revenue percentages
pretty closely. Equation 2.7’s R2 is 0.85, so much of the variation in the actual revenue
percentages is explained. The main di↵erence is that at revenue percentages above
60, the predicted percentages are shifted away from the actual percentages. Overall,
the model fits the data well.

2.5

Results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows the summary statistics and number of rule violations

for campuses and bundles after I unbundle the revenue percentages. In general,
the number of for-profit campuses are increasing over the six years in my sample.
The average revenue percentage is also increasing. Since my sample occurs during
the 2007-2009 recession, and there is evidence that skill acquisition occurs during
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depressed labor markets 9 , students would rely more on Title IV assistance during
recessions. In section 2.2, I find that for-profit students are more likely to be nonwhite,
female, receive more federal loans and Pell grants per student than students in nonprofit colleges, and have a lower family income than students in non-profits. Due in
part to students in for-profit institutions being more likely to be using Title IV aid
and the sluggish labor market recovery, the average revenue percentages have been
increasing from 2008 to 2013, though these factors cannot explain all of the increase.
Also, figure 2.4 shows the distribution of actual revenue percentages by year, which
is shifting towards right and bunching near the 90 percent cuto↵.
The predicted revenue percentages does not entirely reflect the increase in revenue
percentages over this time period. I predict an increase in revenue percentages, going
from about 65.6 percent in 2008 to about 69.7 percent in 2013, as seen in column 6 of
table 2.2. From 2010 to 2013, I predict a decrease in the average revenue percentage.
^ and the indicator function
In equation 2.7, the pseudo revenue percentage, revpct,
interacted with

2,j

are the only time varying components in the model. The time

varying components in my model are not meant to capture the observed shift towards
the 90/10 cuto↵, because I am interested in isolating the HEOA’s e↵ect on revenue
percentages. Since the HEOA policy changes e↵ect all Title IV accepting for-profit
institutions, my estimates cannot entirely rule out e↵ects of the recession and sluggish
labor market recovery on for-profit bundling behavior, though the predicted decrease
in average revenue percentages implies that I’m capturing policy e↵ects and not labor
market trends.

2.5.1

Bundle Size

My theoretical model predicts that switching from a one year to a two year 90/10
violation rule will discourage for-profit institutions from unbundling their campuses,
especially bundles comprised of high percentage campuses. Column 4 of table 2.2
9

See DeJong and Ingram (2001), Sakellaris and Spilimbergo (2000), Dellas and Koubi (2003)
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shows the average bundle size of for-profit campuses that were included in a bundle
from 2008 to 2013. During the six years in my sample, the average bundle size has
monotonically increased from 3.57 in 2008 to 4.86 in 2013. The increase in average
bundle size is consistent with the model’s simulations.
While the increase in bundle size has been relatively steady throughout my sample
as opposed to one large increase in 2010, the increase still provides support for my
theory. Since the violation rule change in the HEOA was e↵ective the day it was
signed in August of 2008, for-profit institutions were anticipating the rules change in
the CFR in 2010. The two year lag between the date of the signing the reauthorization
to the CFR update allowed for-profit institutions time to adjust to the policy change.
So I observe a steady increase in bundle size as opposed to one large increase.

2.5.2

Rule Violations

Table 2.3 shows the predicted number of campuses and bundles violating the 90/10
rule. The rise in revenue percentages causes an increase in the number of potential
90/10 rule violations. Using the estimated revenue percentages for the bundles, I find
that the number of one year violations at the bundle level increased after 2010 in
column 1 of table 2.3, reflecting an increase in the revenue percentages. Two year
violations shown in column 2 of table 2.3 increased in 2011, since it takes an extra
year after the policy change to violate this rule.
Columns 3 and 4 in table 2.3 show the number of campuses violating the one and
two year 90/10 rules. Unbundling the campuses approximately double the number
of one year violators after 2010, though the number of two year violators remains
roughly the same. Before 2010 under the one year rule, I predict many more campuses
violating the one year rule than after 2010. Column 5 in table 2.3 shows that most
of these violations occur in campuses that are bundled with other campuses. For two
year rule violators, before 2010 most of the violations were at campuses that were
bundled. Afterwords, bundled campuses were less likely to violate the two year rule.
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By allowing for-profit institutions to bundle campuses together when submitting
regulatory compliance reports, the Department of Education is decreasing the e↵ectiveness of the 90/10 rule. More campuses would lose eligibility if for-profit institutions were forced to unbundle.

2.6

The E↵ect of the HEOA Rule Change
Though my theoretical model does not address the change in Title IV revenue

for-profit institutions accept, the change in the 90/10 violation rules does o↵er an
incentive to for-profit institutions to increase Title IV revenue. I estimate the e↵ect
of the rule change in the HEOA on the amount of Title IV funds directed to forprofit institutions. After estimating equation 2.7 and predicting revenue percentages
for each campus in equation 2.8, I predict revenue percentages holding bundle fixed
e↵ects constant before 2010 using the equation:
0

\ t,i = ↵
revpct
ˆ0 +

4
X

l

^ t,i + ˆ1,j
↵
ˆ l revpct

(2.10)

l=1

The di↵erence between equation 2.8 and equation 2.10 is that I force I(year

2010)

equal to zero for the entire sample in equation 2.10. The predicted revenue percentages from equation 2.10 are the campus revenue percentages we would have observed
if the rule had not changed. This requires that I assume ˆ2,j captures only the e↵ect
of the change from a one year to a two year rule violation. The HEOA also changed
the way for-profit institutions calculate their 90/10 revenue percentages, allowing
for-profit institutions to count additional revenues as non-Title IV. These changes
were also implemented in 2010 and would cause revenue percentages to decrease if
universities do not change in response. If universities respond to the revenue percentage calculation change, they would have no incentive to increase revenue percentages
above what they were under the one year violation rule.
Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of the predicted campus revenue percentages
\ t,i , versus the distribution of the predicted campus revwith the rule change, revpct
0

\ t,i . With the rule change, campus
enue percentage without the rule change, revpct
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revenue percentages tend to cluster just below the 90 percent cuto↵, which mirrors
the actual revenue percentage distribution. Without the rule change, the revenue
percentage distribution shifted away from the 90 percent cuto↵. The switch to the a
two year violation rule allows for-profit institutions to accept more Title IV revenue
than they previously had, incentivizing campuses to increase their revenue percentages or universities to open new campuses in areas that are accessible to lower income
students.
I calculate the estimated amount of Title IV revenue at each campus by multiplying the estimated revenue percentage and the total tuition and fee revenue. I then
sum the estimated Title IV revenue across for-profit campuses for each year. Figure
2.8 shows the estimated Title IV revenue for-profit institutions accept with the rule
change and without the rule change. I only include campuses that are in my sample
for all six years when calculating the estimated revenue percentages. I find that the
rule change can account for roughly 0.9 billion extra dollars in Title IV aid going
to for-profit institutions each year. Considering that the for-profit institutions in my
sample are generally receiving between 20 to 23 billion dollars in Title IV aid between
2010 and 2013, and extra 0.9 billion dollars is about 4.5 percent more Title IV aid
than they would have otherwise received.

2.7

Conclusion
Congress passed the Higher Education Opportunity Act in 2008, which relaxed

the Title IV aid eligibility requirements on for-profit institutions. Beginning in 2010,
for-profit institutions lose eligibility by violating the 90/10 rule for two consecutive
years instead of losing eligibility after violating it once. The 90/10 rule requires forprofit institutions to receive at least ten percent of their revenue from non-Title IV
sources. Relaxing the 90/10 constraint allowed for-profit institutions to collect more
Title IV revenue from their students, and I find that students at for-profit institutions
use nearly $1,000 more Title IV aid after the rule change. After predicting a revenue
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percentage for each campus, I find that the number of one year 90/10 rule violations
would double if the Department of Education counted every campus as an individual
entity when submitting regulatory compliance reports, instead of allowing for-profit
institutions to bundle campuses together.
Further research is needed to understand the impact on students attending forprofits that violate the 90/10 rule. If a for-profit institution closes, it is required
to find a suitable alternative for its students, but there may not be any suitable
alternatives in the area. To understand the impact of an unbundling policy on the
students, defining and quantifying the number of suitable alternatives in the vicinity
of for-profit institutions that violate the 90/10 rule is necessary.
I also find that relaxing the 90/10 violation rule caused for-profit institutions to
include more campuses in a bundle and to accept more Title IV aid revenue. The
average bundle size increased from about 3.5 to 4.8 among campuses that are bundled.
I estimate that for-profit institutions in my sample receive about $900 million, 4.5
percent, more Title IV aid revenue under the two year rule than they would under
the one year rule. Further research is needed to understand the characteristics of
for-profit institutions that benefit from having the 90/10 violation rule relaxed.
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Fig. 2.1.: Probability areas for the distribution of ✏t1 , ✏t2 .
Under the one year violation rule, the institution must get draws of ✏t1 and ✏t2 from
area A. Under the one year violation rule, the institution can get draws of ✏t1 and ✏t2
from areas A, B, and D. Two draws from area C
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Fig. 2.2.: Simulated Title IV revenue percentages for 100,000 campuses.
The distribution above is for one campus from each university. There are 400,000
possible campuses. The revenue percentage distribution is the same for the other
campuses in each university.
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Fig. 2.3.: Comparison of simulated 90/10 revenue percentages under the one year and
two year violation rule.
The distributions above are the simulated 90/10 revenue percentages for each bundle
under the two di↵erent rules. The revenue percentage distribution is the same for the
other campuses in each university.
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Table 2.1.: Comparison of theoretical and empirical results
Theoretical Results

Empirical Results

85/15 Rule

90/10 Rule

90/10 Rule

1 Yr

2 Yr

1 Yr

2 Yr

<2010

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2.41

2.91

3.21

3.38

1.35

1.47

(0.04)

(0.02)

2010

All Bundles
Avg Bundle Size

Avg Bundle Size

0.5

0.17

0.12
(0.05)

Avg Revenue Percentage

86.4

Avg Revenue Percentage

87.3

87.3

0.9

87.9

65.2

71.1

(0.29)

(0.2)

0.6

5.84
(0.36)

Bundles with at least two campuses
Avg Bundle Size

Avg Bundle Size

2.43

2.91

0.48

3.22

3.38

3.63

4.33

(0.27)

(0.18)

0.16

0.7
(0.33)

Avg Revenue Percentage

86.4

Avg Revenue Percentage

87.3

0.9

87.3

87.9

0.6

73.6

78.7

(0.55)

(0.38)
5.1

(0.67)

Avg University Profit
Avg University Profit

1,286

4,659

3,373

4,246

7,535

3,289

Though the theoretical results are not directly comparable to the empirical results, the theoretical
and empirical results move in the same direction. Standard errors are included for the empirical
results in the parentheses. I include the average expected university profits in the theoretical results,
but I do not have data on university profits.
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Table 2.2.: Campus and bundle summary statistics and predicted revenue percentages

Campuses

Bundles

Size 2

Avg Size

Avg revpctj

\j
Avg revpct

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2008

2645

1969

263

3.57

63.0

65.6

2009

2731

2013

268

3.68

67.5

65.9

2010

2952

2094

274

4.13

70.6

72.1

2011

3131

2136

316

4.15

70.3

71.2

2012

3191

2149

326

4.20

71.9

70.6

2013

3160

2059

285

4.86

71.4

69.7

Year

Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the total number of campuses, bundles of campuses, and
bundles with a size greater than one campus. Column 4 show the average size of a
bundle if that bundle contains at least 2 campuses. Columns 5 and 6 compare the
average revenue percentage observed in the data and the average predicted revenue
percentage across bundles.
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Table 2.3.: Campus and bundle 90/10 rule violations

Bundled
1 Year

2 Year

Unbundled
1 Year

2 Year

In a Bundle
1 Year

2 Year

90

90

90

90

90

90

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2008

11

86

76

2009

17

3

67

32

51

31

2010

32

5

81

42

52

38

2011

33

16

50

17

21

3

2012

28

15

35

16

8

2

2013

19

8

21

8

3

0

I use predicted revenue percentages for all violation calculations. Columns 1 and 2
show the total number of bundles violating the 90/10 rule. Columns 3 and 4 show the
total number of campuses violating the 90/10 rule. Columns 5 and 6 show the total
number of the unbundled campuses that violate the 90/10 rule and are also bundled
with at least one other campus.
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Table 2.4.: Demographic summary statistics of students at for-profit and non-profit
institutions in 2008 and 2012
For-profit students Non-profit students
2008

2012

2008

2012

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

% Female

66.1

57.5

56.7

54.9

% Minority

59.9

54

35.3

40.1

% Not Married

76.8

78.9

82.8

86.7

% Dependent

31.2

35.6

58.7

62.5

% Foreign born

6.3

5

5.2

5.6

47,457

40,833

75,267

71,688

(45,761)

(41,197)

(61,132)

(69,766)

23,984

18,469

32,417

23,507

(25,510)

(23,146)

(32,581)

(27,597)

27.3

26.4

25

23.8

(8.7)

(9.2)

(8.4)

(8.5)

17.9

19.7

21.7

21.5

(4.2)

(4.8)

(4.8)

(4.9)

14,420

30,720

79,990

51,310

Dependent’s Income ($)

Independent’s Income ($)

Age

ACT score

Observations

All dollar amounts are in 2008 dollars. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.5.: Grant and loan summary statistics (percentages) of students at for-profit
and non-profit institutions in 2008 and 2012
For-profit students Non-profit students
2008

2012

2008

2012

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

% with Pell Grants

63.8

75.7

35.7

47.9

% with Fed. Loans

75.9

82.8

41.7

41.9

% with Non-Fed. Loans

43.1

14.6

15.1

5.7

% with Veteran Aid

2.4

5.8

2.4

2.6

All dollar amounts are in 2008 dollars, and are conditional on the student receiving
a non zero amount of that type of aid. Standard deviations in parentheses.

92

Table 2.6.: Grant and loan summary statistics (amounts) of students at for-profit and
non-profit institutions in 2008 and 2012
For-profit students Non-profit students

Percent of Max. Pell Amount

Non Title IV Federal Aid ($)

Non Federal Grant Aid ($)

Non Federal Loans ($)

Federal Loans ($)

Title IV Aid ($)

Pell Grants ($)

Subsidized Fed. Loans ($)

Unsubsidized Fed. Loans ($)

Veteran’s Aid ($)

Observations

2008

2012

2008

2012

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

41

48.9

22.8

30.6

(39.4)

(38.5)

(35.9)

(38.4)

6,675

3,305

2,174

2,432

(4,119)

(2,996)

(2,551)

(2,381)

3,310

3,794

5,659

6,478

(3,365)

(5,098)

(6,304)

(8,897)

6,407

5,362

6,819

5,687

(5,070)

(4,662)

(5,691)

(5,939)

6,057

6,561

5,553

5,719

(2,644)

(2,888)

(2,634)

(2,635)

8,274

10,199

7,465

7,364

(4,759)

(6,093)

(5,280)

(5,843)

2,770

3,365

2,753

3,321

(1,324)

(1,601)

(1,363)

(1,607)

3,285

2,863

3,911

3,262

(1,298)

(1,148)

(1,463)

(1,190)

3,427

3,852

3,773

3,412

(1,530)

(1,995)

(1,818)

(2,098)

6,908

11,244

5,978

6,820

(4,563)

(10,025)

(4,962)

(8,134)

14,420

30,720

79,990

51,310

All dollar amounts are in 2008 dollars, and are conditional on the student receiving
a non zero amount of that type of aid. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.7.: Average total Title IV aid and Pell Grants received by students at forprofit institutions.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

7,228***

7,315***

7,472***

7,560***

7,861***

(156.0)

(170.4)

(171.9)

(176.5)

(179.5)

9,212***

9,171***

9,097***

9,056***

8,915***

(176.0)

(134.5)

(123.2)

(82.82)

(84.25)

1,984***

1,857***

1,625***

1,496***

1,054***

[218.0]

[209.5]

[196.0]

[259.3]

[263.8]

0.410***

0.427***

0.426***

0.388***

0.416***

(0.0130)

(0.00721)

(0.0152)

(0.0114)

(0.00972)

0.489***

0.481***

0.482***

0.500***

0.486***

(0.00726)

(0.00524)

(0.00855)

(0.00533)

(0.00456)

0.0790***

0.0544***

0.0556***

0.112***

0.0697***

[0.0143]

[0.00862]

[0.0172]

[0.0167]

[0.0143]

Dep Var: Total TIV Aid
2008

2012

Di↵erence

Dep Var: Pell Grant Percentage
2008

2012

Di↵erence

Sets of control variables
Student Demographics

X

Student Aid

X
X

Tuition, Campus F.E.

Observations

45,140

45,140

45,140

X
X

X

45,140

45,140

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered standard errors in
brackets. Clusters are at the campus level. Observations rounded to the nearest tenth. All amounts
are in 2008 dollars, except Pell Grant percentages. The maximum Pell Grant amount in 2008 was
$4,310 and the maximum amount in 2012 was $5,304.54 in 2008 dollars (or $5,550 in 2012 dollars).
Student demographic controls include immigration status, income, dependency status, race, age and
age square, sex, marital status, and ACT score. Student aid controls include all other federal aid
(including veterans benefits), all other non federal grants and loans. F.E. = fixed e↵ects
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Table 2.8.: Average Title IV subsidized and unsubsidized loans received by students
at for-profit institutions.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2,376***

2,368***

2,370***

2,527***

2,493***

(69.39)

(71.51)

(64.31)

(51.01)

(45.29)

2,309***

2,313***

2,312***

2,238***

2,254***

(28.14)

(25.93)

(30.21)

(23.94)

(21.26)

-67.38

-55.24

-57.45

-288.7***

-238.3***

[72.41]

[75.28]

[66.88]

[74.95]

[66.55]

2,166***

2,102***

2,175***

2,289***

2,167***

(73.32)

(69.21)

(79.86)

(52.02)

(63.75)

3,069***

3,099***

3,064***

3,011***

3,068***

(41.53)

(46.17)

(47.38)

(24.41)

(29.92)

903.1***

997.0***

889.6***

722.1***

901.7***

[78.51]

[78.81]

[83.03]

[76.43]

[93.68]

Dep Var: Subsidized Loans
2008

2012

Di↵erence

Dep Var: Unsubsidized Loans
2008

2012

Di↵erence

Sets of control variables
Student Demographics

X

Student Aid

X
X

Institution Characteristics

Observations

45,140

45,140

45,140

X
X

X

45,140

45,140

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered standard errors in
brackets. Clusters are at the campus level. Observations rounded to the nearest tenth. All amounts
are in 2008 dollars. Student demographic controls include immigration status, income, dependency
status, race, age and age square, sex, marital status, and ACT score. Student aid controls include
all other federal aid (including veterans benefits), all other non federal grants, and all other non
federal loans. Institution characteristics include tuition and campus level fixed e↵ects.
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Fig. 2.4.: Actual 90/10 revenue percentage distributions in for-profit universities by
year.
The vertical line is at the 90 percent cuto↵.
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Fig. 2.5.: Estimated and actual 90/10 revenue percentage distributions in for-profit
universities.
The vertical line is at the 90 percent cuto↵.
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Fig. 2.6.: Estimated 90/10 revenue percentage distributions: Bundled campuses versus non-bundled campuses.
The vertical line is at the 90 percent cuto↵.
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Fig. 2.7.: Estimated 90/10 revenue percentage distributions in for-profit universities
after 2010.
The vertical line is at the 90 percent cuto↵.
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Fig. 2.8.: Estimated Title IV revenue for-profit universities accept with and without
the rule change. I estimate for-profit universities receive about 4.5 percent more Title
IV aid in revenue due to the rule change.
The solid line is the observed estimated Title IV revenue. The dashed line is the
estimated Title IV revenue without the switch to the two year violation rule. The
di↵erence between the solid and dashed lines is roughly 0.9 billion dollars.
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